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I. INTRODUCTION
In March of 2004, the United States Supreme Court decision in
Crawford v. Washington' revolutionized Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. For nearly a quarter century, Ohio v. Roberts2 had
provided the constitutional standards for the admissibility of evidence
that had met the several states' tests for the admissibility of evidence
over hearsay objections. The essence of the Roberts rule was that the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to
be confronted," 3 does not bar the admissibility of an unavailable
declarant's out-of-court statement if the statement bears "adequate
indicia of reliability. 4 This standard can be satisfied in one of two
ways: (1) if the statement falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception"5 or (2) if the statement bears "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 6
With respect to the "firmly rooted hearsay exception" standard, the
idea is that "hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally
designed to protect similar values." 7 In other words, traditional hearsay
exceptions rest upon such solid foundations of reliability that the
admissibility of statements that fall into one of these exceptions was
thought to comport with the "substance of the constitutional protection"8
of the Confrontation Clause. Most, if not all, of the traditional common
law hearsay exceptions fall within the description "firmly rooted."9
The second Roberts standard allowed for the substantive use of the
uncross-examined statement of an unavailable declarant against a
criminal defendant if the statement bears "particularized guarantees of

1. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004).
2. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

4. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (internal quotations omitted).
5.

Id.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
Id.
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The opinion of the Washington State Court of
trustworthiness."'
Appeals in the Crawford case" illustrates the process that courts used to
determine whether the Roberts standard was satisfied. The Washington
State Court of Appeals in Crawford applied a nine-factor test to
determine whether a statement of an unavailable declarant that is against
his or her penal interest bore "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. ' 2 This test and similar tests required a weighing of
some very subjective factors to determine whether a statement was
sufficiently reliable to admit as substantive evidence despite the
defendant's inability to cross-examine the declarant. In sum, the
Roberts decision represented a determination by the United States

Supreme Court that reliability and trustworthiness of the out-of-court
statement of an unavailable declarant were the touchstones of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 3
The Roberts test appeared to be settled law until March of 2004 when

the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision in
Crawford,4 altered our understanding of the relationship between
hearsay rules in criminal trials and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Consequently, the Illinois courts and legislature must take
a hard look at Illinois common law and statutory hearsay rules to
determine whether they can withstand the new constitutional scrutiny of
Crawford. Clearly, any Illinois statute or common law hearsay rule that
conditions the admissibility of a testimonial statement in a criminal trial
under a hearsay exception on a finding by the trial judge that the out-ofcourt statement is trustworthy is constitutionally flawed.' 5 Equally at
10. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
11. State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-11, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1723 (Wash. Ct. App. July
30,2001).
12. Id. at *12. The factors included: (1) whether the declarant had an apparent motive to lie;
(2) whether the declarant's general character suggested trustworthiness; (3) whether more than
one person heard the statement; (4) whether the declarant made the statement spontaneously; (5)
whether the timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant and the witness
suggested trustworthiness; (6) whether the statement contained express assertions of past fact; (7)
whether cross-examination could help to expose the declarant's lack of knowledge; (8) the
possibility that the declarant's recollection was faulty because the event was remote; and (9)
whether the circumstances surrounding the statement suggested that the declarant misrepresented
the defendant's involvement. Id. at *13-16.
13. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66 (noting that the Confrontation Clause "countenances only
hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that there is no material departure from the reason of
the general rule"; and that even though a "witness [is] unavailable his prior testimony must bear
some of these indicia of reliability" (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
14. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
15. See id. at 1370 (noting that "[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not think
the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection not the vagaries of the rules of
evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 'reliability,"' and finding that "[a]dmitting
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risk is the admissibility of a testimonial statement conditioned on a6
finding that it falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.

Especially at risk are the following Illinois hearsay exceptions: (1)
statements of a child or retarded person in prosecutions for a physical or
sexual act,' 7 (2) statements of a person who refuses to testify despite a
court order, 8 and (3) statements of a now-deceased person.19
Other statutory or common law hearsay exceptions that allow the
admissibility of testimonial statements without affording the accused a
prior or present opportunity to cross-examine the declarant are also
constitutionally flawed. Examples include statements by victims of sex
offenses made to medical personnel for treatment 2 and laboratory
reports.,,
In this Article, we examine each hearsay exception, common law and
statutory, and provide a constitutional evaluation under the Crawford
model. We will first discuss the Crawford case itself and some of the
problematic nuances of the rule announced by the Supreme Court.22 We
will then discuss a number of Illinois cases that have interpreted the
rules set forth in Crawford.2 3 Finally, we will provide an analysis of
Crawford's potential effect on Illinois statutory and common law
hearsay rules. 4
II.

CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: 25 THE NEW RULE

The United States Supreme Court in its Crawford decision has
statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation").
16. See id. at 1369 (stating that the rationale of the Roberts test, which allows hearsay
evidence if it falls under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," departs from the Framers'
understanding and is both broad and too narrow).
17. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10(a) (2002) (providing the hearsay exception for
statements of a child or retarded person in prosecutions for a physical or sexual act perpetrated on
the child or retarded person).
18. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.2 (2002) (providing the hearsay exception for prior
statements made by a non-testifying declarant when the declarant refuses to testify despite a court
order to do so).
19. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.4 (2002) (providing the hearsay exception for prior
statements of a declarant when the declarant is deceased).
20. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-13 (2002) (providing the hearsay exception for
statements by victims of sex offenses made to medical personnel for diagnosis or treatment
purposes).
21. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-15 (2002) (providing the hearsay exception for
laboratory reports).
22. See infra Part 1n(discussing Crawford and the Supreme Court's analysis).
23. See infra Part fII.A (evaluating Illinois cases interpreting Crawford).
24. See infra Parts III.B-C (examining the effect of Crawford on Illinois' various hearsay
rules).
25. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004).
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provided new guidance for complying with the Confrontation Clause of
the United States Constitution.

26

However, the standards espoused do

not answer every question, but leave some questions open for
interpretation, such as when a statement qualifies as testimonial,27 what

constitutes an opportunity for cross-examination,28 and whether the new
rules should apply to cases retroactively.29
A. The Facts
On August 5, 1999, Kenneth Lee was stabbed in his own apartment.3 °
Michael Crawford was arrested later that night.31 Crawford's wife,
Sylvia, was taken into custody as well. 32 After waiving his Miranda
rights, Crawford confessed that he and Sylvia had gone in search of Lee

because Crawford was upset over an earlier incident in which Lee had
allegedly tried to rape Sylvia.3 3 Crawford and Sylvia found Lee at his
apartment and a violent physical altercation
ensued. 34 Lee was stabbed
35
cut.
was
hand
in the torso and Crawford's
Crawford was charged with assault and attempted murder." At trial,
Crawford advanced a self-defense theory.37 The viability of this defense
seemed to rest upon whether Crawford believed that Lee was armed at
the time of the altercation. 38 The stories advanced by Crawford and his
wife to the police seemed to differ somewhat with respect to what had
actually occurred during the fight.3 9 Crawford told the police that he
thought he saw something in Lee's hands right before the fight started.

26. See infra Part II.C (explaining the Court's rationale in Crawford).
27. See infra Part II.D. I (exploring the conditions for a testimonial statement).
28. See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing what constitutes an opportunity for cross-examination).
29. See infra Part II.D.4 (analyzing retroactive application of the Crawford decision).
30. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1357.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. It is not clear exactly where Justice Scalia obtained support for his assertion that Lee
had allegedly tried to rape Sylvia. Both the Washington State Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington simply note that Lee was allegedly making "sexual advances"
toward Sylvia. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 658 (Wash. 2002); State v. Crawford, No. 253071-II, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1723, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 30, 2001).
34. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1357.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id. (reproducing Crawford's account of the fight).
39. See id. ("Sylvia generally corroborated petitioner's story about the events leading up to the
fight, but her account was arguably different .
.
40. Id.
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He said that Lee was "fiddlin' around ' 4 1 in his pocket and said that he
thought that Lee pulled something out. Crawford added that he thought
that he grabbed for this object at that time, resulting in his cut hand.42 In
essence, Crawford asserted that Lee might have had something in his
hand when he stabbed Lee.43
But Sylvia gave an arguably different account to the police of what
transpired in the fight.44 She generally corroborated Crawford's story of
how Crawford and she arrived at Lee's apartment.45 In fact, Sylvia
corroborated Crawford's story that Lee reached into his pocket before
Crawford stabbed Lee.46 However, in Sylvia's tape-recorded statement
to the police, she said that Lee did not have anything in his hands after
stabbed Lee. 47 The prosecution heavily relied on this fact at
Crawford
8
4

trial.

B. The Lower Courts' InconsistentApplication of Roberts
At trial, Sylvia did not testify because Crawford objected to her
testimony claiming that Washington State's marital-privilege statute4 9
barred a spouse from testifying adversely without the other spouse's
consent.5 0 However, Washington's marital-privilege statute did not bar
The prosecution
the admissibility of her out-of-court statement.5
maintained that Sylvia's out-of-court statement was admissible under a
hearsay exception and sought to introduce Sylvia's tape-recorded
52
The State invoked the hearsay exception for statements
statement.
against penal interest under the theory that Sylvia had led Crawford to

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. (detailing Lee's account of events just prior to the fight with Crawford).

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1358 (noting that the prosecution played the tape of Sylvia's interrogation for the
jury and argued that it was "damning evidence").
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1994).
50. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1357.

51. In Washington, the marital privilege does not extend to a spouse's out-of-court statements
admissible under a hearsay exception. Id. at 1358 (citing State v. Burden, 841 P.2d 758, 761
(Wash. 1992)).
52. Id. at 1358. Washington had argued that Crawford waived his confrontation rights by
making his wife unavailable through his exercise of the Washington State marital privilege statute
to bar Sylvia from testifying. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington ultimately rejected
this argument. Crawford would not be forced "to waive one right to preserve another." State v.
Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 660 (Wash. 2002) (citing State v. Michielli, 937 P.2d 587 (Wash. 1997)).
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Lee's apartment and facilitated the assault. 53
Applying Roberts, the trial court admitted Sylvia's statement, finding
that it bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness 5 4 over
Crawford's objection that to allow Sylvia's statement would violate the
Confrontation Clause.55 The trial court reasoned that Sylvia had
corroborated Crawford's story; that she had direct knowledge of the
events as an eyewitness; that she described recent events; and that a
"neutral" law enforcement officer had questioned her.56 A jury
57
convicted Crawford of assault.
The Washington State Court of Appeals reversed Crawford's
conviction." The Court of Appeals also applied the "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" standard of Roberts, but reached an
opposite conclusion on the admissibility question. The Court of
Appeals applied a nine-factor test and concluded that Sylvia's statement
did not bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 5 9 The Court
of Appeals noted that Sylvia had admitted to shutting her eyes during
the assault, 6° and that her statement was made in response to direct
questions by the police rather than as a narrative. 6' The Court of
Appeals rejected the State's argument that Sylvia's statement was
reliable
because Sylvia's and Crawford's
statements
had
"interlocked. 62
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of
Appeals. 63 Also applying Roberts, the Washington Supreme Court
concluded that Sylvia's statement bore "particularized guarantees of

53. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358.
54. According to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, the hearsay exception for a
statement against interest is not a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Crawford,
54 P.3d at 662.
55. See State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-11, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1723, at *5-6 (Wash. Ct.
App. July 30, 2001) (noting that the corroborating circumstances requirement of the hearsay
exception satisfied the Confrontation Clause).
56. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358.
57. Id.
58. State v. Crawford,No. 25307-1-11, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1723, at *21.
59. Id. at *13-16. See supra note 12 (outlining the Roberts test and the nine factors utilized
by the court).
60. State v. Crawford,No. 25307-1-11, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 1723, at *15.
61. Id. at 13-14.
62. Id. at * 17-19. When a co-defendant's confession is virtually identical to that of a
defendant, it may be deemed reliable as an "interlocking" confession. Id. at *17. The Court of
Appeals rejected the State's argument that Sylvia and Crawford's statements interlocked because
the statement's differed as to whether Lee had something in his hand when Crawford stabbed
him. Id. at "18-19.
63. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 664 (Wash. 2002).
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trustworthiness" because Sylvia's and Crawford's statements
Consequently, the court
"interlocked" to a substantial degree. 64
65
reinstated Crawford's conviction.
The United States Supreme Court granted Crawford's petition for a
writ of certiorari to determine whether the use of Sylvia's statement
violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Since the
Roberts test appeared to have been faithfully applied by the lower
courts, Crawford argued that the Supreme Court should reconsider the
Roberts test as a departure from the original meaning and intent of the
67
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the
Confrontation Clause.
United States Supreme Court obliged, reversing Crawford's
68
conviction.
C. The Supreme Court's Response
Because Crawford's position hinged on arguing that existing law had
departed from the historical meaning and guarantees of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, engaged in a lengthy historical analysis of the
Confrontation Clause. Justice Scalia reached two conclusions with
respect to the historical meaning of the Confrontation Clause: (1) "the
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the
civil-law mode of criminal procedure," 69 particularly the use of ex parte
examinations by government officials of witnesses used against
criminal defendants; and (2) "the Framers would not have allowed
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at
trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a
prior opportunity for cross-examination."7 ° Consistent with these two
conclusions, Justice Scalia asserted that the Roberts rule was deficient
in a number of ways.
1. Ohio v. Roberts Was Not Faithful To the Historical Conception of
the Confrontation Clause
The Crawford Court maintained that the Confrontation Clause
procedurally guarantees an individual the right to confront witnesses
against him or her using the specific and constitutionally-mandated tool
64. Id.

65. Id.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Crawford v. Washington, 539 U.S. 914 (2003) (granting certiorari).
Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1359 (2004).
Id. at 1374.
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1365.
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of cross-examination to assess reliability.7' Judicial determinations of
reliability, such as Roberts had allowed, are a "foreign" 72 method of
assessing reliability with respect to the constitutionally-prescribed
method set forth in the Confrontation Clause.73 In other words, the
Confrontation Clause not only guarantees reliability but also guarantees
how reliability should be assessed.74 To this end, only the testing of
testimonial evidence in the "crucible of cross-examination" would have
satisfied the Framers.75
Consequently, the historical problem with the Roberts standard is
that, in theory, it allowed evidence that the Confrontation Clause
historically meant to exclude based solely on a judicial determination of
reliability.7 6 One example of this deficiency cited by the Supreme Court
is the "routine[],, 77 admissibility of grand jury testimony despite the fact
that the accused had not cross-examined the witness. 7 ' Another
historical inconsistency cited by Justice Scalia is the "routine"
admissibility of accomplice confessions that implicate the accused
despite the warning in Lilly v. Virginia79 that these were "highly
unlikely ' 80 to survive the Roberts reliability analysis.8 ' He also cited
71. Id. at 1370.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1371.
77. Id.
78. See United States v. Thomas, No. 01-4168, No. 01-4169, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 4455, at
*4 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2002) (per curiam) (affirming trial court's admission of grand jury
testimony of an unavailable witness thereby rejecting defendant's Confrontation Clause
argument); United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1118-20 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming trial
court's denial of a motion for a new trial where incriminating grand jury testimony of defendant's
stepson was admitted at trial over defendant's objections and stepson later recanted his
incriminating testimony).
79. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
80. Id. at 137 ("It is highly unlikely that the presumptive unreliability that attaches to
accomplices' confessions that shift or spread blame can be effectively rebutted . .. when the
government's involved in the statements' production, and when the statements describe past
events and have not been subjected to adversarial testing.").
81. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1371. Justice Scalia cited a litany of cases that illustrate how
lower courts "routinely" admit such evidence under Roberts. Id. (citing United States v.
Photogrammetric Data Servs., 259 F.3d 229, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2001); People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d
401, 406-08 (Colo. 2001); Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 305, 314-18 (Colo. 2001); Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 151, 166-68 (Ky. 2001); People v. Schutte, 613 N.W.2d 370, 376-77
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Lawrence, 55 P.3d 155, 160-61 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001); People
v. Thomas, 730 N.E.2d 618, 625-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2000); State v. Hawkins, No. 2001-P0060, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 7208, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002); State v. Marshall, 737
N.E.2d 1005, 1009 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); State v. Jones, 15 P.3d 616, 623-25 (Or. Ct. App.
2000); State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 916-18 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)). Justice Scalia also noted
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83
cases showing that plea allocutions 82 and prior trial testimony have
84
been admitted despite the lack of opportunity for cross-examination.
testimonial and
These statements would all likely be considered
excluded by the new rule that the Court announced s5

2. The Roberts Standard Is Inherently Unpredictable
The Court also found deficiency in the Roberts standard because of
86
its inherently subjective and inconsistent nature. Reliability, according
87 To
to the Court, is an "amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.
support this contention, Justice Scalia cited a litany of cases that utilized
similar factors in assessing reliability but applied them in opposite ways
and reached opposite conclusions. 8 The Court indicated its distress that
some courts have concluded that uncross-examined testimonial
statements are reliable by using factors that make the statements
testimonial. 89 Examples would be statements made to the police while

that a recent study found that appellate courts admitted accomplice statements made to the
authorities into evidence more than one-third of the time. Id. at 1372.
82. See United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021-23 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Centracchio, 265 F.3d 518, 527-30 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dolah, 245 F.3d 98, 104-05
(2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Petrillo, 237 F.3d 119, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v.
Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 268-69 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 16668 (2d Cir. 1999).
83. State v. McNeill, 537 S.E.2d 518, 523-24 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); Bintz, 650 N.W.2d at
918-20.
84. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1372.
85. See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 220 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that guilty
plea allocutions violated the Confrontation Clause because they were testimonial and because
defendants did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarants).
86. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1371.
87. Id.
88. Id. The Court explains:
For example, the Colorado Supreme Court held a statement more reliable because its
inculpation of the defendant was "detailed" [People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 407 (Colo.
2001)], while the Fourth Circuit found a statement more reliable because the portion
implicating another was "fleeting" [United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs., 259
F.3d 229, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2001)]. The Virginia Court of Appeals found a statement
more reliable because the witness was in custody and charged with a crime (thus
making the statement more obviously against her penal interest) [Nowlin v.
Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 367, 371-72 (Va. Ct. App. 2003)], while the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals found a statement more reliable because the witness was not in
custody and not a suspect [Bintz, 650 N.W.2d at 918]. Finally, the Colorado Supreme
Court in one case found a statement more reliable because it was given "immediately
after" the events at issue [Farrell,34 P.3d at 407], while that same court, in another
case, found a statement more reliable because two years had elapsed [Stevens v.
People, 29 P.3d 305, 316 (Colo. 2001)].
Id.
89. Id. at 1372.
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in police custody9" or statements given under oath.9'
By way of analogy, the Court sought to elucidate the inherent
subjectivity of the Roberts standard through the facts of Crawford itself.
As noted above, the trial court and the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington in Crawford found that the statement at issue bore
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" to satisfy Roberts, while
the Washington State Court of Appeals found otherwise.92 Justice
Scalia discussed the inconsistent application of reliability standards to
the same set of facts and concluded that Crawford is "one of those rare
cases in which the result below is so improbable that it reveals a
fundamental failure [of the United States Supreme Court] to interpret
the Constitution in a way that secures its intended constraint on judicial
discretion. 93
D. The New Rule and Its ProblematicNuances
At first glance, the new rule announced in Crawford appears rather
straightforward and rigid; testimonial statements of a declarant are not
admissible against the accused unless: (1) the prosecution calls the
declarant as a witness, thus giving the accused a present opportunity for
cross-examination; 94 (2) the declarant is now unavailable, and the
accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him or her; 95 or (3) the
accused has wrongfully procured the declarant's unavailability. 96 While
the rule can be set forth in one sentence, it contains a number of
important nuances that courts, in Illinois and elsewhere, will need to
address when applying the new rule. Specifically, the following
questions will eventually require attention: (1) What is a testimonial
statement?; 97 (2) What is a sufficient opportunity for cross-examination
under the Crawford rule?; 98 (3) What aspects of Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence remain unaffected by the Crawford rule?; 99 and (4)
90. Nowlin, 579 S.E.2d at 371-72 (finding reliable a statement made to police while in
custody on pending charges).
91. United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1120 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding reliability of
grand jury testimony); United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 1999) (asserting
reliability of a plea allocution).
92. See supra Part II.B (discussing the procedural history of Crawford).
93. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1373.
94. Id. at 1369 n.9.
95. Id.at 1365.
96. Id. at 1370 (stating that "the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing ... extinguishes
confrontation claims").
97. See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the testimonial statement requirement).
98. See infra Part II.D.2 (examining what qualifies as an opportunity for cross-examination).
99. See infra Part U.D.3 (exploring those aspects of hearsay law that remain unchanged by
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Should Crawford be applied retroactively?'
1. What Is a "Testimonial Statement"?
Whether a particular statement qualifies as testimonial is the linchpin
of the Court's decision. If a statement is deemed "non-testimonial," the
rule of Crawford cannot be applied to exclude the statement.1 °'
Consistent with this expression, lower courts that engage in Crawford
Roberts,
review continue to apply ordinary hearsay analysis, including
10 2
"non-testimonial."'
deemed
is
statement
when a particular
However, beyond a few "formulations" of what may constitute a
testimonial statement, the Court left "for another day any effort to spell
Those tests
out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial."' 10 3
identified by the Court may not embody the exclusive "formulations" of
what is testimonial. In the Court's words, they simply "share a common
nucleus and then define the [Confrontation] Clause's coverage at
various levels of abstraction around it." 1°4 The Court's analysis,
however, does provide some clues about how future courts may find
whether a given statement is testimonial for Crawfordpurposes.
a. Clearly Testimonial Statements
"At minimum," the following statements are testimonial, as they are
"the modem practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed": prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, prior testimony before a grand jury, prior testimony at a former
trial, and police interrogations.'O0
The testimonial nature of prior testimony is generally self-evident,
However, whether a particular
and even somewhat tautological.
statement given to the police qualifies as testimonial is less clear. The

Crawford).
100. See infra Part II.D.4 (evaluating whether Crawford should apply retroactively).
101. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 ("Where non-testimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly
consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay
law-as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.").
Cir. 2004) (applying Roberts after holding
102. See, e.g., Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (lst
that a casual remark to an acquaintance was not testimonial); People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687,
692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the residual or "catch-all" exception to the hearsay rule after
holding that the underlying statement was not testimonial); see State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191,
201-02 (Conn. 2004) (applying Roberts after concluding that a statement against penal interest to
a friend was not testimonial).
103. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1374.
104. Id. at 1364.
105. Id. at 1374.
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Crawford Court does clearly provide that statements produced during a
police interrogation are testimonial in nature. 0 6 Moreover, under the
Confrontation Clause analysis, the Fifth Amendment's custody
limitation does not apply.' °7 Statements "knowingly given in response
to structured police questioning, qualif[y] under any conceivable
definition. ' '
Implicitly, not every conversation with the police will
qualify as a testimonial statement.
Some of the cases decided subsequent to Crawford have encountered
this uncertainty and have held that some conversations with the police
are "non-testimonial."' 9 Whether a statement given to the police is
testimonial or non-testimonial requires a fact-intensive judicial inquiry.
Some factors that courts have used in deciding this question include: (1)
whether the police initiated the encounter;"0 (2) whether the statement

was made in response to "structured police questioning";." (3) whether
the statement was brief or informal;"

2

(4) whether the statement was

made in a formal setting or informally at the scene of a crime; 1 3 and (5)
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1365 n.4 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)). Under the
Fifth Amendment's custody limitation, "the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a
person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." Innis,
446 U.S. at 300-01. "[T]he term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 301.
108. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4.
109. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663, 683 n.22 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
statements of an eventual murder victim to police officer responding to victim's 911 call was not
testimonial because victim was not being interrogated by the police and only sought help in
"ending a frightening intrusion into her home"); State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211 (Me. 2004)
(holding that a statement by an eventual murder victim to the police was not testimonial despite
the fact that the declarant went to the police station and reported that her son assaulted and
threatened to kill her); Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind.Ct. App. 2004) (holding that
police officer's "informal" questioning of citizens near the scene of a crime is not testimonial);
People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 2244, *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004)
(holding statement of a mortally wounded shooting victim in response to police asking "what
happened?" not testimonial); People v. Newland, 775 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(noting that a brief informal remark by a citizen to an officer conducting a field investigation is
not testimonial); State v. Forest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 24 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that statements
of a hostage immediately after being freed from her captor to the police were "non-testimonial,"
although the police did ask some questions after the hostage started talking). But see Moody v.
State, 594 S.E.2d 350 (Ga. 2004) (holding that a statement made in response to a police officer's
field interview was testimonial).
110. Leavitt, 371 F.3d at 683 n.22; Barnes, 854 A.2d at 211; Forest, 596 S.E.2d at 27.
111. Newland, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 331 (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4).
112. Id.
113. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 952. The Hammon court held a statement made in the field was
non-testimonial despite the fact that it was made in response to a direct police question. Id.
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whether the declarant was simply seeking "safety and aid."' 14 In any
event, there clearly remains a significant amount of ambiguity in this
standard that courts must eventually face. Questions may include
whether informal police field interviews can be testimonial police
interrogations, whether 911 calls are police interrogations," 5 and

whether statements made to prosecutors or social workers constitute
police interrogations under certain circumstances.
b. Testimonial Statements are Not Limited to In-Court Testimony
A strict and literal reading of the Confrontation Clause would support
the argument that the accused's right to confront "witnesses" means
only those witnesses who actually testify at trial."' 6 The Supreme Court,
17
however, rejected this overly restrictive reading of the Constitution.
The Court's interpretation of "witness" avoids a narrow construction of
the Confrontation Clause and instead opts for a more inclusive
18
conception of "witnesses" as those individuals who "bear testimony."'
Testimony, in turn, is defined as a "solemn declaration or affirmation
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."" 9 Justice

Scalia did not attempt to fix the outer parameters of testimony, but he
did provide an illustration of the concept: "[a]n accuser who makes a
formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that
120
a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.'
This illustration suggests that a certain degree of formality or
government involvement is required for a statement to be deemed
testimonial.' 2' Using this formulation, some courts have enlarged the
114. Barnes, 854 A.2d at 211.
115. See infra Part III.C.9 (discussing 911 calls in the context of the Illinois common law
hearsay exception for excited utterances or spontaneous statements).
116. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ").
117. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. "[A]ny statement made 'casually' rather than for the purposes of 'going on the record'
with a government agent or agency" is clearly not testimonial. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, A
STUDENT'S GUIDE TO HEARSAY 3 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2004). Professor Fishman asserts that
this excludes all statements admitted under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B)-(D), 803(1),
803(4), and 804(b)(3) unless they are made to a police officer or other government official. Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that defendant's confession
to his mother before she had any contact with law enforcement were "casual remarks to an
acquaintance" and, thus, not testimonial); United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137-1, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13650, *18 (N.D. I11.July 16, 2004) (holding that declarant's statements to friends
were not testimonial solely because there was no government involvement in making the
statements); People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 855 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a statement
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definition of "testimonial statements" to include statements made to
government officials other than police officers.'
c. "Formalized" Testimonial Materialsare Testimonial
Another formulation of testimonial is identified by Justice Scalia as
"extra-judicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions.' ' 123 This formulation of testimonial comes from Justice
Thomas's concurrence in White v. Illinois, which espoused a narrow

view of testimonial that confines it to actual testimony at trial or certain
formalized materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions. 2 4 This view essentially applies the Confrontation Clause
only to certain specific materials that the Framers of the Constitution
would historically have deemed testimonial. As such, this represents
the most rigid of the approaches taken to ascertain when Crawford will
apply. Moreover, this view seems to preclude any informal statements,
even those made to police, because they would not25 be formalized
confessions or accompanied by other formal materials.
Justice Thomas specifically rejected any standard that "[a]ttempts to
draw a line between statements made in contemplation of legal
proceedings and those not so made"'126 because this type of inquiry
would "entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties"' 27 related to the
categorization of testimonial statements. 28 Consequently, it seems

to a doctor by the victim identifying the accused as the assailant was not testimonial because there
was no government involvement).
122. See United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp.2d 896, 902 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (holding that
statements made to a Department of Justice prosecutor were testimonial); Mikos, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13650, at *17-18 (holding that statements made to a Department of Health and Human
Services investigator, who was formally investigating healthcare fraud, were testimonial).
123. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1364.
124. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
joined by Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment).
125. See, e.g., Cage, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 855-57 (holding that statements of a victim of a
battery to a police officer-who was trying to determine if a crime had been committed-at the
hospital asking were not testimonial because there was very little formality in this interview, the
officer was engaged in fact-gathering rather than evidence-gathering, and the interview took place
in a neutral, public place). The Court in Cage also notes that "Crawford strongly suggested that a
hearsay statement is not testimonial unless it is made in a relatively formal proceeding that
contemplates a future trial," and that "[w]hen people refer to a 'police interrogation' ... they have
in mind something.., formal and focused." Id. at 856-57.
126. White, 502 U.S. at 364.
127. Id.
128. Justice Thomas gives the examples of "a victim who blurts out an accusation to a passing
police officer, or the unsuspecting social-services worker who is told of possible child abuse[.]"
Id.
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relatively clear that statements made under informal circumstances,
even if made to the police or other government officials, would not fall
within the heading testimonial under this approach, regardless of the
expectations of a reasonable declarant.
Courts applying this stringent formulation must define a testimonial
statement narrowly, including only those made at trial or contained in
an affidavit, deposition, or formal confession to the police. Thus far,
only one court interpreting Crawford has deviated from these express
examples of "formalized testimonial materials"'2 9 given in Crawford.30
It remains to be seen how much further the lower courts will extend this
formulation of testimonial statements, and whether it will survive
scrutiny.
The degree of formality required to meet the standard for "formalized
testimonial materials" creates ambiguity. 13 ' Neither Justice Scalia in
Crawford nor Justice Thomas's concurrence in White clarified what
degree of formality is required under this approach. This ambiguity is
potentially ripe for interpretation. For example, the existence of trial
testimony, affidavits, and depositions are self-evident, but what
constitutes a "formal" confession to the police may depend on a number
of factors with respect to the circumstances under which it is made.
Consequently, despite Justice Thomas's desire in White to avoid
problematic and subjective line drawing in defining testimonial
statements, 132 courts may still have to engage in fact-specific inquiries
into what degree of formality will elevate a statement made to a
government official to a testimonial one under this approach.
Furthermore, issues remain as to what degree of formality would be
required to find statements other than confessions made to the police to
be testimonial.13 Obviously, depositions and affidavits of such nonconfessing individuals would qualify as testimonial, but less formal
statements made to government officials may or may not. For example,
it seems unclear whether uninterested citizens reporting or describing a
129. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 365).
130. See United States v. Massino, 319 F. Supp. 2d 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that guilty
pleas are precisely the kind of formalized confession that constitutes testimonial material under
Crawford).
131. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364 (describing various formulations of testimonial
statements).
132. White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and

concurring in judgment).
133. One example would be citizens simply providing information to the police. See
Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1364 (explaining that statements made to a police officer, even though
not sworn testimony, could be testimonial).
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crime to the police in statements that are not memorialized in an
affidavit or deposition would be testimonial under this formulation.
Certainly, these are not confessions, nor are they "formal" in the sense
of being memorialized.
Under other formulations of testimonial
statements, these statements would be characterized as testimonial.
However, since Justice Thomas's approach rejects any such ad hoc
determination of the circumstances under which the statement was
made, it appears unlikely that courts applying this formulation would do
SO.
d. "[Ex parte] in-court testimony or its functional equivalent"'1 34 Can
Be Testimonial
The Crawford Court identified another formulation of testimonial
statements as "ex parte [sic.] in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent."'3 5 Justice Scalia, quoting from petitioner Crawford's brief,
defined "functional equivalent" as "material such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to crossexamine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially.' 36
Beyond these specific examples of affidavits, custodial examinations,
and prior testimony, it is unclear what statements would fall into the
class of the catch-all category of "similar pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially." The
supporting material in the petitioner's brief seems to indicate that the
focus of this objective portion of this formulation is, at least in part,
contingent on the reasonable expectations of the declarant when the
statement was made.'37 For example, the petitioner's brief notes that
statements made "without litigation in mind' 3 8 are not testimonial. The
petitioner's brief further notes that the Confrontation Clause "does not
apply to hearsay statements made unrelated to any pending or potential
prosecution."' 3 9 The implication of this formulation seems to be that
certain statements made in less formal circumstances could be regarded
as testimonial provided that the declarant could reasonably have

134. Id. at 1364 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford (No. 02-9410)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford (No. 02-9410) (citing White, 502 U.S. at 365;
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986);
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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4
believed that the statements would be used in a later prosecution.'
However, the petitioner's brief sought support for the above
formulation of testimonial statements in Justice Thomas's concurrence
in White,14 ' a view that narrowly confines testimonial statements to
those actually made at trial or contained in certain specific formalized
materials. 42 Justice Thomas's view in White is a distinct standard and
inapposite here because he rejected any standard that "[a]ttempts to
draw a line between statements made in contemplation of legal
proceedings and those not so made." 43 The standard set forth in the
petitioner's brief seems to advocate such line drawing. 44 Consequently,
it is likely that less-formal materials (even those other than confessions
made to the police) could be admitted as testimonial statements under
this formulation. It remains to be seen how far courts applying this
formulation will go beyond confessions made to the police.

e. "[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be availablefor use at a later trial"4 5 are Testimonial.
Justice Scalia also identified another formulation of testimonial
statements, as proffered in the Amici Curiae, the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL): 14 6 "statements that were made
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial.' ' 147 At first glance, this approach focuses on the individual who
witnesses the making of the statement, rather than on the declarant. A
correct reading of the Amici brief, however, states that "an out-of-court
statement is testimonial only when the circumstances indicate that a
reasonable declarant at the time would understand that the statement
140. See id. (explaining that statements made with the expectation of potential use in
prosecution are testimonial and must be subject to cross-examination).
141. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment).
142. Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford (No. 02-9410) (citing White, 502 U.S. at 365). See
supra Part Il.D.I.c (explaining that formalized statements, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony and confessions are testimonial).
143. White, 502 U.S. at 364.
144. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Petitioner's argument for
refining what should be testimonial).
145. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 3, Crawford (No. 02-9410)).
146. Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. at 3, Crawford
(No. 02-9410).
147. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal
Def. Lawyers et al. at 3, Crawford (No. 02-94 10)).
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' 48
would later be available for use at a criminal trial."'
The Court did not provide any further explanation as to the
parameters of this standard. Amici provided some guidelines, however,
that may assist the lower courts in applying this standard. First,
49

statements unrelated to any criminal investigation are not testimonial.

Examples given by Amici include statements made as a medical patient

rather than as a "witness" to a crime, statements of a co-conspirator
made in furtherance of a conspiracy, and excited utterances. 5 ° These
examples contrast with statements made by an individual who
approaches a police officer and provides information that incriminates
another individual or himself.'5 ' The latter would be testimonial under
this standard because the individual has "assumed the role of 'witness'
and has "spoken under circumstances which he or she should
52
reasonably expect will lead the State to punish the accused person."
Amici further noted that "[b]y and large, statements made to law
enforcement officials about a crime will be testimonial ... [and that]...
statements made to friends, relatives, accomplices, or anyone outside of
the criminal justice system will not be testimonial."' 5 3 Lower courts
148. Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et a]. at 22, Crawford
(No. 02-9410) (emphasis added). The Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois, in one
recent case, rejected the Amici formulation that defines testimonial statements as "statements that
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial," noting that it "overlooks the crucial
'witnesses against' phrase of the [Clonfrontation [C]lause and casts too wide a net... " In re
T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 804 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004). This dismissal, however, is premature
and ill-advised. We will demonstrate that in the application of the Crawford rule to Illinois
hearsay exceptions, there may be situations in which inquiring into the reasonable belief of an
objective declarant in making a statement would serve to best effectuate the intent of the
Crawford Court. See infra Part I (examining Crawford's effect on hearsay in Illinois).
149. Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. at 23, Crawford
(No. 02-9410) (explaining that when a statement is made at a time unrelated to any criminal
investigation, the declarant is not a "witness" within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 24.
152. Id. Using this formulation, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has held that a declarant's
private recording of another person at the encouragement of law enforcement personnel made in
order to obtain incriminating statements shifting blame from that individual was testimonial
because it was "made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to reasonably
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." In re J.K.W., No. A03-1650,
2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 783, at *9-10 (Minn. Ct. App. July 6, 2004) (quoting Crawford, 124 S.
Ct. at 1364).
153. Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. at 25, Crawford
(No. 02-9410). Amici note some ambiguities in this approach, especially with regard to 911
calls, which could be interpreted as a form of police interrogation (which would make the
statement testimonial) or simply as an electronically enhanced "loud cry for help" (in which case
they would be deemed not testimonial). Id. See People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 416 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that 911 calls are testimonial); People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274, 277
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interpreting Crawford have generally accepted this distinction. 154 This
formulation may include statements made to individuals who are
sufficiently identified with law enforcement despite the fact that they
may not technically be "law enforcement officials.' 5 5

2. What Is a Sufficient Opportunity for Cross-Examination for
Crawford Purposes?
The Crawford majority observed that the new rule and the
Confrontation Clause "place[] no constraints at all on the use of ...

prior testimonial statements" when "the declarant appears for crossexamination at trial.' 56
Consequently, it is "irrelevant that the
reliability of some out-of-court statements 'cannot be replicated, even if
the declarant testifies to the same matters in court."'" 57 Justice Scalia
then spoke in unequivocal terms, noting that the Confrontation Clause
"does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is
present at trial to defend or explain it.' 58 Although Justice Scalia spoke
59
in terms of present opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at trial,
he presumably did not intend to exclude the use of an out-of-court
statement if the accused had a previous opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant about the out-of-court statement at a60 former trial or other
judicial proceeding such as a preliminary hearing.
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding 911 calls are not testimonial); People v. Isaac, No. 23398/02, 2004
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 814, at *12 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. June 16, 2004); see also infra Part 111.9 (discussing
911 calls).
154. See Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84 (lst Cir. 2004) (finding that statements made in a
private conversation were not made under circumstances in which an objective person would
reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial); see also United
States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that statements against interest
made to a friend are not testimonial); People v. Deshazo, 679 N.W.2d 69, 69 (Mich. 2004)
(holding as non-testimonial a statement against penal interest made to a friend); People v.
Cervantes, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a statement made to a friend
seeking medical advice was not testimonial).
155. See, e.g., People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding as
testimonial a statement made to a forensic interview specialist); In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 80001 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004) (holding that statements of a child victim of sexual abuse to a
DCFS investigator and a physician were testimonial under Crawford).
156. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 n.9 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 162 (1970)).
157. Id. at 1369 (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1377 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).
158. Id. The First District has spoken in even more unequivocal terms, noting that "[tihere is
no confrontation clause issue when the declarant is on the witness stand." People v. Thompson,
812 N.E.2d 516, 521 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004) (emphasis added).
159. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 & n.9.
160. See id. at 1365-66 (claiming that the Framers intended to allow admission of testimonial
evidence if the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had an opportunity for crossexamination before trial).
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A question remains, however, whether Crawford requires a mere
opportunity for cross-examination or whether it demands that there was,
in fact, meaningful and effective cross-examination. Although the
Crawford opinion did not address this concern, Crawford should be
read in the context of other aspects of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
For example, in Kentucky v. Stincer, 6 ' the United States Supreme Court
held that the accused's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated
when he was excluded from an in-chambers examination of two young
victims of an alleged sex offense to determine whether they were
competent to testify.1 62 The Court refused to find a violation because
defense counsel participated at the hearing, and further questions
concerning their competency could be raised at trial with the defendant
present. 63 Here, the United States Supreme Court explicitly declared
that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees only 'an opportunity for
in
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective
'1 4
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."'
The accused must, however, be given at least a sufficient opportunity
for effective cross-examination. Statements made at a preliminary
hearing, for example, should be admissible so long as the accused had
sufficient opportunity for effective cross-examination. 65 A statement is
also admissible where the witness has a mere gap in memory and is
available for cross-examination. In United States v. Owens, the victim
recalled, in his trial testimony, making the out-of-court identification of
the accused, but he could not recall who had assaulted him.1 66 The
United States Supreme Court found no Sixth Amendment violation in
who testified at trial,
the use of an out-of-court statement of a victim,
167
and had identified the defendant as his attacker.

161. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (per curiam).
162. Id. at 746-47.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 739 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)).
165. The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Fry, for example, held that under Crawford
the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness cannot be used against the accused
because the nature of preliminary hearings in Colorado does not afford the accused a sufficient
opportunity for effective cross-examination. People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970, 979 (Colo. 2004). In
Colorado, preliminary hearings are limited to "matters necessary to a determination of probable
cause" and "the rights to cross-examine witnesses and to introduce evidence are limited to the
question of probable cause." Id. at 977. In states such as Illinois, where preliminary hearings are
in the nature of full-adversarial proceedings, Crawford will not likely pose a bar to the
admissibility of testimonial statements at trial as long as the accused was actually afforded a
sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing.
166. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 556 (1988).
167. Id. at 564. Justice Scalia, who authored the majority opinion in Owens, reasoned that the
out-of-court declarant was present in court and was subject to cross-examination about his out-of-
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There is a serious constitutional problem where the witness has no
recollection at all of making the out-of-court statement. Crawford
should bar the admissibility of the witness's out-of-court statement
because, under these circumstances, there is no opportunity whatsoever

to cross-examine the witness about having made the out-of-court
statement. 168 Similarly, Crawford and the Sixth Amendment will be
violated if the trial judge allows the admissibility of an out-of-court

statement where the witness denies making the statement. Once again,
there is no16opportunity
of any kind for the accused to cross-examine the
9
declarant.
3. What Aspects of Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence Remain
Unaffected by the CrawfordRule?
In a footnote, the Crawford Court explained that the Confrontation
Clause does not bar the use of testimonial statements "for purposes
other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.0 70 Thus, the
admissibility of out-of-court statements that are offered for a nonhearsay purpose will remain unaffected by Crawford. Traditional nonhearsay uses of out-of-court statements-such as for impeachment,"71 to
provide a basis for an expert's opinion, 172 to prove that a declarant said

court statement. Id. at 560-61. The defendant had an opportunity to explore the gap in memory
during the cross-examination of the witness. Id. at 559-60. According to Justice Scalia, this is
all that the Sixth Amendment guarantees: an opportunity to question the witness about the making
of the out-of-court statement. Id. at 563-64. It does not guarantee effective or successful crossexamination. Id. at 563-64. Justice Scalia, nonetheless, suggested that evidence of memory
failure may, in fact, be effective cross-examination. Id. at 560. The opinion of the Illinois
Appellate Court in People v. Martinez supports the conclusion that a mere gap in the witness'
recall will not pose a constitutional bar to the admissibility of the out-of-court testimonial
statement. People v. Martinez, 810 N.E.2d 199, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004). See infra Part
III.A.2 (discussing Martinez).
168. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 n.9 (2004) (finding that the
Confrontation Clause does not bar admission of a statement if the declarant is present to explain
it).
169. See id. (discussing the requirement that, for admission, the defendant must have had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant).
170. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)).
171. See, e.g., People v. McPherson, 687 N.W.2d 370, 376 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that a statement of the declarant to a police officer, to which the officer testified, was admissible
in order to impeach the accused's credibility).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 222 F.R.D. 334, 339 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (holding that
while statements of defendant's employees to IRS investigators may have been testimonial under
Crawford, the statements were nonetheless admissible as a basis for the IRS investigator's expert
opinion); see also State v. Jones, No. COA03-976, 2004 N.C. App. LEXIS 1655, at *6 (N.C. Ct.
App. Sept. 7, 2004) (admitting testimonial statements to demonstrate the basis of an expert's
opinion).
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something in the witness's presence,1 73 and statements used to explain or
demonstrate circumstantially a declarant's state of mind or explain
conduct by an individual 74-will remain admissible post-Crawford.
Furthermore, the Crawford majority accepted the fact that an accused
would not be protected under the Confrontation Clause by operation of
the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. 75 Crawford poses no bar to
the admissibility of an out-of-court testimonial statement where the
testimony of an adverse witness through
accused has silenced the
76

violence or other means.1

4. Does the CrawfordRule Apply Retroactively?
Judicial opinions announcing new constitutional rules applicable to
criminal cases are retroactive to all cases pending on direct review at the
time the new constitutional rule is announced. 77 Beyond this general
rule, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, has expressly
to cases
recognized on a number of occasions this effect of Crawford
78
pending on direct review when Crawfordwas decided.

173. See, e.g., McPherson, 687 N.W.2d at 376-77 (holding that statement of declarant to
police officer, to which the officer testified, admissible to show the accused's knowledge of the
statement).
174. See, e.g., Delarosa v. Bissonette, No. 03-2559, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14402, at *3 (1st
Cir. July 14, 2004) (holding admissible under Crawford the statement of a police officer that
there was going to be a delivery of drugs to the defendant's residence at a particular time because
the testimonial statement was not being used to establish the truth of the matter asserted);
Waltmon v. State, No. 08-03-00317-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 7285, at *18 (Tex. App. Aug.
12, 2004) (statement of an anonymous tipster reporting that accused's car was driving erratically
admissible to show why responding officer was in the vicinity of accused's car).
175. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1370 (2004).
176. Id. Lower courts have even permitted the operation of the rule of forfeiture by
wrongdoing when the death of the declarant is the very charge that the accused faces. See State v.
Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 797 (Kan. 2004) (holding in a murder case that murder victim's testimonial
statement to police officer that the accused shot him was nonetheless admissible because the
prosecution carried its burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused
killed the victim). Lower courts have also held that a defendant forfeits the right to confront a
witness when the out-of-court statement relates to an event that is entirely separate from the
charged act. See People v. Moore, No. 01CA1760, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1354, at *10-11
(Colo. Ct. App. July 29, 2004) (holding that accused forfeited right of confrontation with respect
to victim's testimonial statement about an unrelated earlier domestic violence incident). In
response to an argument that the application of a forfeiture analysis is impermissible
"bootstrapping" under these circumstances, Professor Richard Friedman has noted that this
situation is no different than when "a defendant is accused of conspiracy charges and the
prosecution argues that the hearsay rule poses no bar to admission because the statement was
made by a conspirator of the defendant and in support of the conspiracy." Richard D. Friedman,
Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores ConfrontationClause Protection, 19 CRIM.
JUST. 4, 12 (2004).
177. People v. Ford, 761 N.E.2d 735, 738 (I11.2001).
178. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 798-99 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004); People v. Thompson,
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Crawford should be applied retroactively in proceedings under the
Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act,179 as well. 8 ° Illinois has adopted
the test set forth in Teague v. Lane 8 ' to ascertain whether a new rule
will be given retroactive effect to subsequent cases on collateral review
for the purposes of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 8 2 The
United States Supreme Court has described this inquiry as a three-step
process, which seeks to ascertain when the defendant's conviction was
final, what was the "legal landscape as it then existed,"' 8 3 and whether
the new rule is actually "new. ' 4
A "new rule" is one that "breaks new ground, or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government ... [or] was not

dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final."' 85 If a rule is not "new," it is outside the scope of Teague
and will be applied retroactively. 8 6 Similarly, the United States
Supreme Court has distinguished between new substantive rules and
new procedural rules. If the United States Supreme Court announces a
new substantive rule, there is a general rule of retroactivity because
such rules "necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands
convicted of 'an act that the law does not make 87
criminal' or faces a
punishment that the law cannot impose upon him."'
If there is a new procedural rule at issue, the general view is that it

812 N.E.2d 516, 521 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004); People v. Martinez, 810 N.E.2d 199, 211 (111.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004); People v. Cook, 815 N.E.2d 879, 892-93 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
179. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/122-1-8 (West 2004).
180. It is well settled in Illinois that a proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is
not an appeal but a collateral attack on the judgment. People v. James, 489 N.E.2d 1350, 1353
(Ill. 1986). The purpose of a post-conviction proceeding is to inquire into the constitutional
phases of the original conviction which have not already been adjudicated. People v. Williams,
264 N.E.2d 697, 698 (I11. 1970). Proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act are not
meant to provide the petitioner an opportunity to relitigate his or her case. Consequently, issues
that were raised on direct appeal are generally res judicata as to all issues decided. People v.
Kubat, 501 N.E.2d 111, 116 (111. 1986) (citations omitted). Issues that could have been raised on
direct appeal, but were not raised, are considered waived. People v. Albanese, 531 N.E.2d 17, 18
(Ill. 1988).
181. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion).
182. People v. Flowers, 561 N.E.2d 674, 681-82 (Ill. 1990).
183. Beard v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 2510 (2004) (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461,
468 (1993)).
184. Id.
185. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
186. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1990) (rejecting appellee's contention that certain
cases involving the Eighth Amendment were not "new rules").
187. Schiriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2522-23 (2004) (quoting Bousley v. United
States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).
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will not have retroactive effect.'88 If the United States Supreme Court
has announced a "new rule of constitutional law,"' 89 and one of two
exceptions are met, a new rule may be applied retroactively to cases on
collateral review.' 90 The first exception is that a new rule should be
applied retroactively "if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe."" 9' The second exception permits retroactive
application if the new rule requires the observance of those procedures
that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 92
The applicable Teague exception for Crawford purposes should be
the exception to nonretroactivity for a new decision that "requires the
observance of 'those procedures that ...are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."'' 93 This second exception has been interpreted to
encompass "watershed rules of criminal procedure."' 194 Essentially, two
requirements must be satisfied for a new rule to fall into this second
exception: (1) the rule must improve the accuracy of the trial's truthfinding function; and (2) the rule must also "alter our understanding of
the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a
proceeding."' 95
The first issue that Crawford poses in this analysis is whether it is
actually a "new" rule. The factors that have been enumerated by the
United States Supreme Court in this inquiry focus on whether the rule
"breaks new ground, or imposes a new obligation on the states or the
Federal Government ...[or] was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final.' 96 While Crawford
has created a different paradigm for evaluating the admissibility of
testimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause than has been
applied over the past quarter century, it does not necessarily follow that
this is a "new" rule.

188. Id. at 2523; Teague, 489 U.S. at 305-06 (plurality opinion).
189. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (explaining that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A),
only the United States Supreme Court can make new rules of constitutional law retroactive for

cases on collateral review).
190. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (plurality opinion).
191. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)).
192. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937),
overruledon other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969)).
193. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693).
194. See id.at 311 (plurality opinion) (referencing Justice Harlan's opinion in Mackey, 401
U.S. at 693-94, which discusses bedrock procedural elements required before any conviction will
be upheld).
195. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990) (internal citations omitted).
196. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion).
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In this regard, the text of Crawford itself provides powerful evidence
that Crawford is not, in fact, a "new" rule at all. First, the very issue in
Crawford was whether Roberts had strayed from the original meaning
of the Confrontation Clause.' 97 Consequently, the issue was whether
Roberts was a constitutionally correct "new" rule with respect to the
Justice Scalia
historical meaning of the Confrontation Clause.
the historical
from
deviated
had
that
itself
Roberts
was
it
that
concluded
a "new" rule
announcing
by
understanding of the Confrontation Clause
that premised the admissibility of evidence on an individualized judicial
98
determination that a statement meets a standard of trustworthiness.
Justice Scalia asserted, nonetheless, that notwithstanding the rationale in
Roberts, the results of Confrontation Clause precedent both before and
after Roberts "have generally been faithful to the original meaning of
the Confrontation Clause . . . ."'99 It is the rationale of past precedent
rather than the precedent itself that Crawford sought to constitutionally
rectify.2°° Thus, United States Supreme Court precedents including
Roberts itself are an "empirically accurate" application of the Crawford
rule.2 ° ' Consequently, the Crawford holding was, in fact, "dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became
final. 20 2 Crawford should therefore probably not be regarded20 as
3 a
"new" procedural rule at all and should be given retroactive effect.

While some courts deem Crawford a "new" procedural rule,204 it
should nonetheless be applied retroactively because it falls under the
second Teague exception: Crawford "requires the observance of those

197. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359 (2004).
198. Id. at 1369.
199. Id.

200. Id.
201. Id. at 1369 n.9.
202. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (plurality opinion).
203. See, e.g., Bockting v. Bayer, No. 02-15866, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3012, at *36-37 (9th
Cir. Feb. 22, 2005) (Noonan, J., concurring) (arguing that Crawford does not announce a "new"
rule under the Teague analysis but rectifies an earlier incorrect interpretation of the rule and, thus,

"[rietroactivity is not an issue").
204. See Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219, 1226 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding Crawford simply
established new standards for the admission of certain kinds of hearsay and did not create a
"watershed rule" of criminal procedure as articulated in Teague and therefore should not be
retroactively applied); Garcia v. United States, No. 04-CV-0465, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14984,
at *8-10 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004) (finding Crawford did not alter bedrock procedural elements
of criminal procedure, but simply clarified procedure, and therefore, was not a watershed rule
requiring retroactive application); Hutzenlaub v. Portuondo, 325 F. Supp. 2d 236, 238 (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (finding Crawford did not require retractiviy in application); Murillo v. Frank, 316 F. Supp.
2d 744, 749-50 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (finding Crawford did not trigger either of the two Teague

exceptions).
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procedures that ...are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 5
The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, applied this rationale in the
context of the Confrontation Clause in People v. Kubik2°6 and held that
Cruz v. New York 0 7 should be given retroactive effect under the PostConviction Hearing Act. 20 8 The Supreme Court held in Cruz that
"where a nontestifying co-defendant's confession incriminating
the
defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant, the
Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the
jury is instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and even if the
defendant's own confession is admitted against him. ' '209 In Kubik, the
defendant was tried with several co-defendants.
At trial, the
confessions of the co-defendants were played in front of the jury with a
simple limiting instruction that the jury could only use the evidence
against the confessing defendants.2 ° While this instruction would
clearly have violated the rule later announced in Cruz, this instruction
was proper under the state of the law at the time of Kubick's trial,
exemplified by Parkerv. Randolph.2 1 Because Cruz was decided after
Kubick had exhausted his direct appeals, he attempted a collateral attack
on his conviction via the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, arguing
2 12
that Cruz should be given retroactive effect.
The First District concluded that Cruz should be given retroactive
effect under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 213 The Illinois Appellate
Court recognized that Cruz created a new procedural rule. The new rule
met the second exception of Teague v. Lane2 14 in that Cruz created a
new procedural rule "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 2 15 To
qualify under this exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity, a
new rule must improve the accuracy of the trial's truth-finding function
and "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements

205. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality opinion) (internal citations omitted).
206. People v. Kubik, 573 N.E.2d 1337 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1991).
207. Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
208. Kubik, 573 N.E.2d at 1342-43.
209. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 1932 (internal citations omitted).
210. Kubik, 573 N.E.2d at 1339.
211. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979) (plurality opinion), overruled on other grounds
by Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987). Parker reaffirmed the validity of "an instruction
directing the jury to consider a co-defendant's extrajudicial statement only against its source ...
sufficient to avoid offending the confrontation right of the implicated defendant." Id. at 73-74
(plurality opinion).
212. Kubik, 573 N.E.2d at 1339-40.
213. Id.
214. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).
215. Kubik, 573 N.E.2d at 1342 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 307).
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essential to the fairness of a proceeding. ' 2 16 To meet the "accuracy"
element, the court found that Cruz's direct impact on the admissibility
of evidence at trial satisfied this. 2 7 As for the second element, the court
found it was satisfied by the fact that Cruz extinguished the
"interlocking" confession exception and, consequently, significantly
changed the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause by requiring the
cross-examination of certain declarants where this was not previously
required. 218 The court also noted, in this context, that "[t]he right of
21 9
cross-examination is a fundamental guarantee of liberty.
Consequently, the new rule was essential to the "fairness and
constitutional integrity of [the] criminal proceeding. 2
Crawford presents a strong case for retroactivity under the TeagueKubik analysis. Since Crawford imposes a rigid requirement of crossexamination concerning testimonial out-of-court statements not required
by Roberts, Crawford improves the accuracy of the truth-finding
function of the trial. 22' The "accuracy" element is satisfied because
there is a significant effect on the admissibility of testimonial statements
which ultimately benefits the fairness of the trial.
Secondly, Crawford unquestionably "alter[ed] our understanding of
the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a
proceeding. 22 The very essence of the Crawford opinion is that
Roberts223 created an unacceptable ad hoc standard of admissibility of
evidence that is highly subjective. That standard, which is premised on
a judicial determination of trustworthiness of the statement, violates the
bedrock procedural guarantee of the Confrontation Clause that
"reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible
of cross-examination.2 24
Moreover, since Crawford has generally changed how all
216. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990) (internal citations omitted).
217. Kubik, 573 N.E.2d at 1342.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1340 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404--05 (1965)).
220. Id. at 1342.
221. See, e.g., People v. Miles, 815 N.E.2d 37, 43 (Il1. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2004). The Illinois
Appellate Court for the Fourth District in Miles announced, in dicta, that Crawford applies
retroactively "because [Crawford's] change in (or return to) constitutional doctrine enhances the
truth-finding function of trial ..... Id. at 44 (finding that Crawford holds "testimonial statements
of witnesses assent from a criminal trial are admissible only if: (1) the declarant is unavailable;
and (2) the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the time of the
statement").
222. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 243 (1990) (internal citations omitted).
223. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled in part by Crawford v. Washington, 124
S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
224. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1370 (2004).
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Confrontation Clause issues must be resolved (beyond simply the use of
a co-defendant's confession as was at issue in Cruz), it has dramatically
changed the face of the Confrontation Clause, more so than
Cruz.
Consequently, Crawford unquestionably altered our understanding
of
the procedural elements implicit in the Confrontation Clause. Applying
Kubik as precedent, it seems difficult to see how Crawfordcould not
be
applied retroactively when Cruz clearly was.
The United States Supreme Court has held that significant changes
in
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence warrant retroactive application
on
collateral review on a number of occasions. Most notably, both Cruz 22 5
and Bruton v. United States226 have applied retroactively on federal
habeas corpus review. 227 Moreover, Illinois courts have applied both of
these cases retroactively in collateral review under the Illinois
PostConviction Act.228 Accordingly, Crawford should also apply in
this

manner as well.

But should Crawford be applied retroactively in federal habeas
corpus proceedings? Federal courts have split on this issue.
In

225. Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987). See supra note
209 and accompanying text
(discussing the holding in Cruz).
226. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (finding a violation
of the Confrontation
Clause where the co-defendant's confession was admitted at a joint
trial, and the co-defendant did
not testify).
227. See Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294 (1968) (per
curiam) (applying Bruton
retroactively to cases on habeas review due to the serious risk that
the issue of guilt or innocence
might not have been reliably determined).
228. See People v. Kubik, 573 N.E.2d 1337, 1343 (I11.App. Ct.
1st Dist. 1991) (listing Illinois
cases retroactively applying Bruton and Cruz). See, e.g., People
v. Somerville, 245 N.E.2d 461,
465 (Ill. 1969) (recognizing that Bruton is applicable in Illinois);
see also People v. Davis, 264
N.E.2d 140, 142-43 (I11. 1970) (recognizing that Bruton is
applicable to Illinois, but not
applicable to statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy
since these statements are an
exception to the hearsay rule); People v. Ikerd, 265 N.E.2d 120,
121 (Ill. 1970) (recognizing that
Bruton is applicable in Illinois, but distinguishing Bruton from
a situation where a co-defendant
testifies and denies the confession).
229. See Bockting v. Bayer, No. 02-15866, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
3012, at *14 (9th Cir. Feb.
22, 2005) (finding that Crawford merits retroactive application
because it implicates the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings and it
"reworks our understanding of
bedrock criminal procedure"); Brown v. Uphoff, 381 F.3d 1219,
1226 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding
Crawford simply established new standards for the admission of
certain kinds of hearsay and did
not create a "watershed rule" of criminal procedure as articulated
in Teague and therefore should
not be retroactively applied); Garcia v. United States, No. 04-CV-0465,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14984, at *8-10 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2004) (finding Crawford did
not alter bedrock procedural
elements of criminal procedure but simply clarified procedure and,
therefore, was not a watershed
rule requiring retroactive application); Hutzenlaub v. Portuondo,
325 F. Supp. 2d 236, 238
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding Crawford did not require retroactivity in
application); Murillo v. Frank,
316 F. Supp. 2d 744, 749-50 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (finding Crawford did
not trigger either of the two
Teague exceptions).
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Murillo v. Frank,23 ° for example, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin held that Crawford is a "new" rule under

Teague23' because it essentially overruled Roberts23 2 with respect to

testimonial statements.233 The court reasoned that Crawford failed to fit
into any of Teague's exceptions to non-retroactivity. The Murillo court,
however, recognized that whether Crawford fit into any of these
exceptions was a close question because of Justice Scalia's assertions
that the Crawford rule has actually been accurately applied with respect
235
to the outcomes of precedent.234 As argued above, there are many
reasons why Crawford should be applied retroactively under Teague
and its progeny. The Ninth Circuit essentially has adopted the analysis
set forth above to apply Crawfordretroactively to federal habeas corpus
proceedings. 236 This analysis of Teague, Summerlin, and Crawford
provide the better interpretation. Thus, despite the holdings of postCrawford cases that reject its retroactive application, Crawford should
be given retroactive effect in federal habeas corpus proceedings as well.

230. Murillo v. Frank, 316 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
231. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).
232. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled in part by Crawford v. Washington, 124
S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
233. Murillo, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 749-50.
234. Id. at 749-50 n.4. The Murillo court considered it a close call because while "Crawford
rejected the application of Roberts to testimonial statements, the [Supreme] Court had never
explicitly applied Roberts to such statements." Id.
235. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (discussing whether Crawford should be
given retroactive effect to Illinois post-conviction proceedings).
236. Bockting v. Bayer, No. 02-15866, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3012, at *4 (9th Cir. Feb. 22,
2005) (holding that the Crawford rule is both a "watershed rule" and one "without which the
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished" and therefore retroactive) (quoting
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2523 (2004)). In large part because Justice Scalia in
Crawford had repeatedly asserted that Crawford remained "faithful to the original meaning" of
the Confrontation Clause and that even cases decided under Roberts were an "empirically
accurate" application of the Crawford rule, the Bockting court struggled with whether Crawford
created a new rule at all. Id. at *9-13. In the end, the court held that Crawford was indeed a
"new" procedural rule it was necessary to determine retroactivity. Id. at * 13. The court held that
Crawford fell into the Teague exception of "bedrock rules of criminal procedure." Id. at *14.
The court held that "[h]undreds of years of tradition have embedded [Crawford's unequivocal
requirement of cross-examination of testimonial statements] as ... fundamental." Id. at * 16. The
court, citing nearly the United States Supreme Court's entire Confrontation Clause jurisprudence,
further held that Crawford unquestionably implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of
the criminal proceeding because the very purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to promote
accuracy. Id. at *18-20. Furthermore, the central concern with Roberts, according to the court,
was that evidence was being admitted for which there was not a sufficient procedural guarantee
of reliability. Id. at *20-23. Consequently, the Bockting court held Crawfordshould be applied
retroactively to federal habeascorpus proceedings. Id. at *28.
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III. How DOES CRAWFORD AFFECT ILLINOIS HEARSAY RULES?
Crawford may have little or no effect on some Illinois hearsay rules,
but it will significantly affect others. Whether Crawford will impact
Illinois hearsay rules, and to what extent, will likely depend on two
considerations. First, it will depend upon whether the United States
Supreme Court decided definitively that the Confrontation Clause and
Crawford apply only to testimonial statements, thus leaving all other
hearsay statements to regulation by state hearsay law. 237 This appears to
be the view of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer but remains
dictum.238 Second, it will also depend upon how broadly the lower
courts, and eventually the United States Supreme Court will formulate a
definition of what is a testimonial statement for Confrontation Clause
purposes.239
At present, neither of these concerns can be answered definitively.
The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, has followed the dictum of
the Supreme Court and held that non-testimonial statements "do not
trigger enhanced protection under the Confrontation Clause.,, 240 The
First District has also endorsed language in Crawford that seemed to
advocate approaches that allowed states greater flexibility in addressing
non-testimonial hearsay or that exempted such non-testimonial hearsay
from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. 24' This conclusion
captures the essence of Crawford's limits. 242 Consequently, Illinois
courts should use ordinary state rules of evidence to test the
admissibility of non-testimonial statements.
The second issue is a bit more tricky and speculative. As set forth
above,243 the United States Supreme Court was less than clear as to what
237. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004). See also supra notes 101-04
and accompanying text (exploring the result of a statement's categorization as testimonial on
confrontation clause analysis).
238. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1374 (discussing the concept of testimonial evidence).
239. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing various formulations for what constitutes testimonial

statements).
240. See In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004) (holding that statements
made by an unavailable out-of-court declarant for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment
were not testimonial and, consequently, did not implicate the Sixth Amendment).
241. People v. Martinez, 810 N.E.2d 199, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004) (citing Crawford,
124 S. Ct. at 1374). The Crawford Court noted that "[w]here non-testimonial hearsay is at issue,
it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their
development of hearsay law-as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such
statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether." Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1374.
242. See id. (finding "[w]here non-testimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with
the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law"); see also
supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of non-testimonial hearsay).
243. See supra Part lI.D. I (discussing the various formulations of testimonial statements).
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standards lower courts should employ in deciding what is testimonial.
Consequently, lower courts have applied different formulations. While
the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, recently gave some indication
of what constitutes a testimonial statement,2 " Illinois courts may end up
applying any one of the many formulations of what is a testimonial
statement or simply crafting a formulation of their own.
A. What Do the Illinois Cases InterpretingCrawford Tell Us?
Illinois
S 245courtsfa have addressed Crawford in substance on four
occasions thus far.
1. People v. Patterson
The Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, decided People v.
Patterson246 on May 4, 2004. In Patterson, a murder case, the State was
allowed to introduce incriminating grand jury testimony of the
defendant's girlfriend after she refused to testify on Fifth Amendment
grounds.247 The testimony was admitted under the hearsay exception
that allows as substantive evidence the prior statements of a grand jury
witness when the witness refuses to testify at trial despite being ordered
by the court to do so.24 8 The defendant was convicted in a jury trial.249
The Fourth District affirmed, finding that it was error (albeit harmless
error under the circumstances of the case) to admit the girlfriend's grand
jury testimony in light of Crawford, which had been decided while the
defendant's appeal was pending.250 While not engaging in any broad
formulation of what may constitute a testimonial statement, the court
251
noted that "the term includes testimony given before a grand jury.

244. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 800 (agreeing with Crawford that "governmental involvement
in some fashion in the creation of a formal statement is necessary to render the statement
testimonial in nature").
App. Ct. 4th
245. See infra Part III.A.I (discussing People v. Patterson,808 N.E.2d 1159 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist.
Dist. 2004)); Part llI.A.2 (discussing People v. Martinez, 810 N.E.2d 199 (I11.
2004)); Part HI.A.3 (discussing People v. Thompson, 812 N.E.2d 516 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
2004)); Part II.A.4 (discussing In re T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004)). Illinois
courts have discussed Crawford in a number of other cases not discussed in length in this section.
These cases, where notable, are discussed fully in the body of the article.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2004).
246. People v. Patterson, 808 N.E.2d 1159 (I11.
247. Id. at 1163-64.
248. Id. at 1164. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.2 (2002 & Supp. 2004) (providing a
statutory hearsay exception for prior statements when the witness refused to testify despite a court
order to testify).
249. Patterson, 808 N.E.2d at 1163.
250. Id. at 1165; see supra Part II.D.4 (discussing the retroactive application of Crawford to a
case on appeal).
251. Patterson,808 N.E.2d at 1164.
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Furthermore, the court called the continuing validity of chapter 725,
section 5/115-10.2 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes into question in
light of Crawford, because the statute, "focusing as it does on a judicial
determination of trustworthiness, can no longer be said to incorporate
the relevant constitutional standard. 252
2. People v. Martinez
The second important Illinois decision that has applied Crawford
principles is People v. Martinez. 53 Here, the defendant was convicted
of first-degree murder and aggravated battery in a bench trial. 2 4 The
Crawford issue in Martinez involved an eyewitness to a fatal gang
beating.255 The witness first identified the defendant in a photo array
and then picked the defendant out of a line-up.2 6 After the line-up, she
gave a statement to an Assistant State's Attorney.257 At trial, the witness
testified and was subjected to cross-examination.258 When the witness
testified, she stated that she only remembered about half of the incident
but was certain of the events when she gave a statement to the Assistant
State's Attorney.25 9 The State was subsequently allowed to introduce
the witness's prior written statement as a prior inconsistent statement.26 °
The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed the conviction
and the admissibility of the witness's prior statement to the State's
Attorney under Crawford.26 ' The court noted that the statement given to
the State's Attorney was clearly testimonial within the meaning of
Crawford.2" However, since the defendant was able to fully crossexamine the witness at trial, Crawford and the Confrontation Clause
"place[d] no constraints at all on the use of [the witness's] prior

252. Id.; see infra Part 111.B.6 (discussing section 5/115-10.2). The Patterson decision also
tells us that Illinois courts are willing to engage in "harmless error" analysis, as was suggested in
the Crawford opinion. The Crawford majority officially expressed no opinion on whether courts
should engage in harmless error analysis. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359 n.1
(2004). However, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in concurrence, notes that the majority has implicitly
recognized this. Id. at 1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
253. People v. Martinez, 810 N.E.2d 199 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
254. Id. at 203.

255. Id. at 204.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 204-05.
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 209. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.1 (2002) (providing a statutory hearsay

exception for prior inconsistent statements).
261.
262.

Martinez, 810 N.E.2d at 212.
Id.
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testimonial statements.,

263

The court noted that the defendant was able

to test the witness's ability to recall the circumstances surrounding her
prior statement and to impeach her credibility. 264
The court
distinguished the present case from People v. Yarbrough,265 where the
witness was not able to recall making the prior statement at all.266
According to the court, the present statement was closer to a gap in the
26 and
witness's memory.267 Under the authority of People v. Flores
269
United States v. Owens, therefore, the admissibility of the prior

statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause.27° Martinez
illustrates that Crawford will not generally prohibit the use of prior
uncross-examined testimonial statements when the declarant actually
testifies at trial and is subject to present cross-examination.2 7'
263. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 n.9 (2004)).
264. Id. at211.
265. People v. Yarbrough, 520 N.E.2d 1116 (111. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1988).
266. Id. at 1120 (finding a claim by a witness of a loss of memory makes cross-examination
impossible and admission of the witness's out-of-court statements a violation of the
Confrontation Clause).
267. Martinez, 810 N.E.2d at 210.
268. People v. Flores, 538 N.E.2d 481, 488 (Ill. 1989) (finding a witness's prior testimony
does not have to directly contradict testimony at trial to be considered inconsistent).
269. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (reaffirming that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that
is actually effective in the eyes of the defendant).
270. Martinez, 810 N.E.2d at 211.
271. Id. The court did not address the issue of whether Crawford would pose an obstacle to
the use of a witness's prior testimonial statement if the witness denies making the statement at all
or does not remember making the statement. This question was left open by the Owens decision.
See generally Owens, 484 U.S. at 554 (failing to address how Crawford would impact the use of
testimonial statements in such a situation). Crawford itself makes the unequivocal statement that
"when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraintsat all on the use of his prior testimonial statements." Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.
Ct. 1354, 1369 n.9 (2004) (emphasis added). Therefore, it seems unlikely that Crawford would
permit prior testimonial statements that the witness denies making or does not recall making to be
admitted against the accused. Arguably, under these circumstances, the use of such evidence
would not afford any opportunity to the accused for cross-examination. However, whether this
would theoretically be admissible under Crawford may be irrelevant because the Martinez court
noted that:
[I]n determining whether a prior out-of-court statement is admissible, the proponent of
the statement first must meet the requirements of the applicable statutory hearsay
exception as set out in 725 ILCS 5/115-10 ... [and] Crawford should be considered
only after the court determines the proffered statement complies with the requirements
of the applicable statute.
Martinez, 810 N.E.2d at 212. Consequently, there will be no Crawford inquiry unless the
requirements of chapter 725, section 5/115-10 et seq., of the Illinois Compiled Statutes are
satisfied. Id. As noted in Martinez, Illinois distinguishes between situations where the
declarant/witness forgets the circumstances or basis for a prior statement and situations where the
declarant/witness forgets ever making the statement in the first place. Id. at 210. The former
could satisfy section 5/115-10.1(b)'s requirement that the witness be subject to cross-examination
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3. People v. Thompson
The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, decided People v.
Thompson 27 on June 22, 2004. Thompson involved a prosecution for
aggravated domestic battery, aggravated battery, and unlawful
restraint.
The defendant was charged with tying up and beating his
fiancde because of a suspected affair.274 While the defendant had twice
confessed to the police that he beat his fianc6e, at trial, he denied that he
told the police that he beat her or tied her up.275 The defendant also
testified that he never threatened to physically harm her and that he
never had a "domestic violence issue" with her. 276 The State then
sought to challenge the factual basis of the defendant's testimony by
introducing statements that the victim had made in an application for an
order of protection related to this incident.2 77 In that application, she
said that the defendant had tied her up and beaten her. 78 It appears from
the court's opinion that the victim had then changed her story and for
that reason, the prosecution did not call her as a witness. 279 The trial
court permitted the use of the prior statement, and the jury ultimately
convicted the defendant.28 °
On appeal, the First District overturned the convictions and found the
use of the victim's statements in the application for an order of
protection violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights because
the defendant never had an opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. 21 Applying Crawford, the court held that the statements
were testimonial. 28 2 The court reasoned that the defendant never had an
concerning the statement. The latter could not, under the authority of Yarbrough, because there
would be no sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the truth or falsity of the
statement. See supra notes 265-71 and accompanying text (discussing Yarbrough).
272. People v. Thompson, 812 N.E.2d 516 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
273. Id. at 517.
274. Id. at 518-19.
275. Id.
276. Id. at519.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 520.
279. Id. at 521. The defendant's fiancde testified at the sentencing hearing that the defendant
was the "perfect provider" and that he had not beaten her or tied her up and that another person
was responsible for those acts. Id. at 520.
280. Id. at 519-20.
281. Id. at 520. Although the court referred to the statement as impeachment evidence, it was
used substantively against the accused. Id. at 521.
282. Id. The Thompson court reiterated that the Crawford Court refused to address what
specifically would be considered testimonial and refused to give any further indication of what
would be considered testimonial in Illinois other than noting that a few specific examples would
be testimonial, including "testimony at preliminary hearings, testimony before a grand jury or at a
prior trial, in-court guilty plea statements of co-conspirators to show existence of a conspiracy,
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opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.2 3 The declarant also was
not "unavailable" to the State, as evidenced by her testimony at the
sentencing hearing. 284 The court had a relatively easy time concluding
that the statement was testimonial. The court was correct because
statements made in a formal court petition would fit almost any
formulation of testimonial. 5 Additionally, Thompson, in dictum,
clarified the issue of whether a defendant retains the right to confront
himself by noting that "the [C]onfrontation [C]lause [does not] bar
admission of a defendant's inculpatory statements. 2 86
4. In re T.T.
Perhaps the most significant case in Illinois that has applied
Crawford principles is In re T.T.287 T.T. involved a delinquency
adjudication against the minor respondent for two counts of aggravated
criminal sexual assault.2 8
The minor respondent, T.T., allegedly
sexually assaulted G.F., a seven-year-old girl for whom his mother was
babysitting, on two occasions. 28 9 G.F. told her mother, P.F., of the
abuse soon after it allegedly occurred, but P.F. did not contact the police
or take G.F. to a doctor.290 The Department of Children and Family
Services ("DCFS") eventually contacted P.F. four and a half months
later regarding the abuse, in response to a report from a citizen to a
DCFS hotline. 29' After several unsuccessful attempts to contact P.F. and
G.F., DCFS investigator Lewis went to P.F. and G.F.'s home to speak
with them about the alleged abuse.292 Finding P.F. and G.F. leaving the
home, Lewis interviewed G.F. in the front seat of her car while P.F. sat
in the back seat. 293 Lewis introduced herself and interviewed G.F. using
open-ended questions. 4 Without the assistance of P.F. and without any
prompting by Lewis, G.F. gave Lewis a detailed account of the alleged
and statements made during police questioning, including accomplice statements and statements
against penal interest." Id. (discussing Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004)). The
court also refused to comment on whether statements made to individuals who are not law
enforcement agents could ever be considered testimonial. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See supra Part II.D. l.c. (discussing extra-judicial statements).
286. Thompson, 812 N.E.2d at 521.
287. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
288. Id. at 792.
289. Id. at 793.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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abuse.295
A few days after Lewis interviewed G.F., G.F. was examined by Dr.
Michelle Lorand, an expert in child abuse, in response to a referral by
DCFS for a medical evaluation of the alleged sexual abuse.296 Dr.
Lorand first spoke to P.F. regarding the abuse and then spoke with G.F.
alone to hear, in G.F.'s own words, what occurred.2 97 In response to Dr.
Lorand's questions, G.F. then described what was physically done to
her during the alleged assault.298
Approximately two weeks after Dr. Lorand examined G.F.,
Detectives Dwyer and Collins of the Chicago Police Department met
with P.F. and G.F. at police headquarters.2 99 The two detectives
interviewed G.F. while P.F. sat outside the open room.3°° They
informed G.F. that they were police officers and were assigned to
investigate sex crimes cases.30' They then asked G.F. questions about
what had occurred at the respondent's mother's house.30 2 G.F. identified
T.T. as the offender and once again gave detailed answers describing
the abuse.3 °3
Because the court anticipated that G.F. would testify at trial, the trial
court held that G.F.'s statements to both Lewis and Detective Dwyer
would be admissible under the hearsay exception for statements made
by a child in a prosecution for physical or sexual abuse. 3°4 At trial, the
parties stipulated to the prior testimony of Lewis and Detective Dwyer
regarding G.F.'s statements to them at the evidentiary hearing.30 5 Dr.
Lorand testified at the trial about the statements that G.F. had made to
her.30 6
Dr. Lorand's testimony included both G.F.'s statements
describing the nature of the abuse and, over the defense's objection,

295. Id. at 793-94. Respondent told G.F. that they were going to "play wrestling, but took her
into a bedroom and removed her pajamas, forcing her to have intercourse with him." Id.
Respondent also told G.F. that he would kill her if she told anyone what he did. Id. at 794.
296. Id.
297. Id. Dr. Lorand asked if anyone "had ever hurt her in her private parts" to which G.F.
responded "yes." Id. Dr. Lorand then asked G.F. who had hurt her, to which G.F. responded that
it was T.T. Id. at 794-95.
298. Id. at 795.
299. Id. at 794.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10(b) (2002); In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 794.

305. Id. at 795.
306. Id. at 794.
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07
G.F.'s identification of T.T. as the offender.
On direct examination, G.F. testified that T.T. and she were "playwrestling" in T.T.'s mother's bedroom and that T.T. tried to unbutton
her pants.3 °8 However, when the prosecutor asked G.F. what happened
after that, she said "[n]othing."3 9 After a number of unsuccessful
attempts (including repeated rephrasing of questions, leading questions,
and assurances to G.F. that it was "okay to talk about it"3 °) by the
prosecutor to get G.F. to repeat the story that she allegedly had told
Lewis, Detective Dwyer, and Dr. Lorand, the trial court found that G.F.
was unavailable as a witness."' At the close of the state's case-in-chief,
the respondent moved for a directed finding, which the court denied,
stating that the admitted out-of-court statements were "reliable and
corroborated by Dr. Lorand's testimony. 3 12 In closing, respondent
argued that G.F.'s out-of-court statements testified to by Lewis,
Detective Dwyer, and Dr. Lorand were inconsistent with her in-court
testimony that "nothing3 14happened."3 3 Nonetheless, the respondent was
adjudicated delinquent.
The respondent appealed, and during the pendency of the appeal, the
United States Supreme Court decided Crawford. 15 Consequently, T.T.
and the State both submitted briefs on the effect of Crawford on the
admissibility of G.F.'s out-of-court statements. 316 In the end, the
primary issues on appeal involved the Confrontation Clause.3 17 The
court disposed of the State's waiver argument and then confronted

307.
308.

Id. at 794-95.
Id.

309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 796.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.; Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
316. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 796-97.
317. Id. at 797. On appeal, the respondent initially challenged only the trial court's
determination that G.F. was unavailable. Id. at 797-98. On the unavailability issue, the First
District had little trouble affirming the trial court's finding. Id. It found that the trial court
utilized the correct legal standard in finding G.F. unavailable and that the trial court applied this
standard correctly in the circumstances of this case. Id. at 798. The First District had a
particularly strong reason for affirming G.F.'s unavailability, since the respondent had taken an
inconsistent stand on this question at trial by not moving to strike G.F.'s direct testimony. Id.
Instead, the respondent had argued that G.F.'s testimony that "nothing happened" supported both
a directed finding and an acquittal. Id. Consequently, the First District was unwilling to allow
the respondent to change strategies on appeal to argue that he was prejudiced by the testimony.

742
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Crawford directly.3 18 The court engaged in a summary of the Crawford
opinion. It reviewed the various formulations of what may constitute a
testimonial statement, noting that the Crawford Court had not
commented on the merits of any of the formulations.319 In fashioning its
own approach for the present case, the court noted that Justice
Thomas's formulation, in his concurrence in White,32 ° cautioned against
any approach that looked at the subjective intent of the declarant. 321 The
court also noted that Crawford made clear the fact that ex parte
testimony elicited by a government officer, neutral to the declarant, was
inadmissible in the absence of unavailability and an opportunity for
cross-examination.322
Thus, the First District concluded that
"governmental involvement in some fashion in the creation of a formal
' 323
statement is necessary to render the statement testimonial in nature.
"When other factors are also present (the statement substituted for the
declarant's testimony at trial, was produced ex parte, and was
accusatory when made), the [C]onfrontation [C]lause's guarantee of
cross-examination is triggered. 324
Applying these principles, the court had no problem in finding that
G.F.'s out-of-court statements to Detective Dwyer were testimonial and
inadmissible due to G.F.'s unavailability. 32 5 The court noted that a
"witness's recorded statement knowingly given in response to
structured police questioning... qualifie[s] as testimonial under any
conceivable definition. 326 In finding that the facts of the present case
fit into this framework, the court noted that G.F "knew why she was
there, 327 that she was asked specific, rather than open-ended questions,
318. Id. at 798-99. The first issue was whether the respondent had waived any Confrontation
Clause claim with respect to the testimony of Lewis and Detective Dwyer, because he had
stipulated to the admissibility of their testimony given at a statutorily mandated evidentiary
hearing in lieu of actual testimony at trial. Id. at 789. The First District rejected this argument,
noting that "Uludicial opinions announcing new constitutional rules applicable to criminal cases
are retroactive to all cases pending on direct review at the time the new constitutional rule is
declared." Id. at 798 (citing People v. Ford, 761 N.E.2d 735 (Il1. 2001)). The First District also
noted that "a party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute at any time." Id. The court
further noted that the respondent had stipulated to the admissibility of this testimony only "to
avoid unnecessary repetition." Id. at 799.
319. Id. at 799.
320. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment).
321. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 800.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1367 n.7 (2004)).
325. Id. at 800-01.
326. Id. (citing Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4).
327. Id. at 801.
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and that the State filed a delinquency petition the day after the
328
interview.
The court also found that G.F.'s statement to DCFS investigator
Lewis was testimonial and inadmissible.32 9 This, however, posed a bit
more of an analytical problem for the court. The court noted that
DCFS's role in investigating child abuse has "both criminal and social
welfare implications"33 but that DCFS functions "as an agent of the
prosecution"33 ' under many circumstances. Consequently, to determine
whether G.F.'s statements to Lewis were testimonial, it was necessary
to ascertain the extent to which Lewis was working to assist a
prosecutorial effort.332 In doing so, the court looked both at DCFS's
investigation process and the particular circumstances of this case.
Citing a number of statutory and regulatory provisions, the court noted
that DCFS often works in "conjunction with law enforcement in
'
assisting the prosecutorial effort."333
In the immediate circumstances, the court observed that during
Lewis's interview of G.F., there was no indication that G.F. was at
"imminent risk ' 334 and that G.F. was not taken into protective
custody.335 The court held that "where the focus is on whether the
declarant is bearing witness against a criminal defendant when making a
formal statement to a government officer with an eye toward
' such as here, these statements are testimonial.337
prosecution,"336
In holding G.F.'s statements to Lewis testimonial, the court was
particularly concerned with the State routinely using "surrogate
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. For example, DCFS immediately refers reports of alleged child sexual abuse to the
police. Id. (citing 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7 (2002 & Supp. 2004); 89 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89,
§ 300.70 (2000)). It also may delegate an ongoing investigation to the police. Id. at 801 (citing
325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.3 (2002); 89 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 300.80 (2000)).
Furthermore, a DCFS investigator will often interview people helpful to the investigation after
seeing to the safety of the child. Id. (citing 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.4(b)(3) (2002 & Supp.
2004)).
334. Id. at 802.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. The state argued that the fact that Lewis's interview of G.F. was "impromptu," that it was
conducted in a neutral location, that Lewis asked open-ended questions, that there was no law
enforcement officer present, and that the interview occurred before the filing of any delinquency
petition all mitigated in favor of finding that G.F.'s statements were not testimonial. Id. The
court found that a "court's attempt to fashion such factors into some type of litmus test for
testimonial evidence would undermine the [C]onfrontation [C]lause." Id.
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testimony of social workers ' 33 8 to avoid preparing and presenting child
witnesses for cross-examination. However, the court explicitly held that
not all statements made to a social worker are "per se testimonial. 3 39
Significantly, the court noted that reports via telephone call to a DCFS
hotline may not be testimonial. 340 The court also noted that statements
of sexual abuse overheard by a social worker might be non-testimonial
as well. 4'
Finally, the court addressed the testimony of Dr. Lorand. 342 The court
had a relatively easy time deciding that G.F.'s statements to Dr. Lorand
identifying T.T. were testimonial in nature, as the statements directly
accused T.T. of the crime.
The statutory source for the admissibility
of these statements is the hearsay exception for a victim's statements
made to medical personnel for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment in a prosecution of certain sexual offenses. 3 " In finding these
statements non-testimonial, the court overlooked the significance of the
fact that G.F. was only seen by Dr. Lorand months after the alleged
abuse because of a DCFS referral, noting that although G.F.'s mother
had never had her examined after the assault, "government officials like
police officers commonly take sexual assault victims to the hospital for
treatment and evaluation., 345 The court did not address the fact that the
medical exam here took place nearly five months after the alleged abuse
took place. The court also observed that although Dr. Lorand was a part
of a child abuse trauma team, she was not charged with facilitating the
prosecution of T.T.346 and that her "primary investment in cooperating
with law enforcement was in facilitating the least traumatic method of
diagnosis and treatment for the alleged victim" rather than the
prosecution of T.T.347
Recognizing that medical examinations of sexual assault victims
involve the collection of evidence for later use at trial, the court
nonetheless held that a victim's statement regarding the "descriptions of
338. Id.
339. Id. at 803 (finding possible scenarios, including calls to DCFS hotlines or statements of
sexual abuse overheard by a social worker, would be admissible as "non-testimonial hearsay").
340. Id. The court cited the New York case People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. 2004), dealing with 911 calls, in reaching this conclusion.
341. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 803.
342. Id. As noted above, Dr. Lorand testified both to G.F.'s statements about the nature of the
abuse and the identification of T.T. as the abuser.
343. Id.
344. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-13 (2002 & Supp. 2004).
345. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 803.
346. Id.
347. Id.
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the cause of symptom, pain or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof'3 48 is not testimonial
349 The
when it does not accuse or identify the perpetrator of the assault.
court reasoned that these statements were made by a patient "with a
selfish interest in treatment ' 350 and were not accusatory against T.T.
when made. 35' In so holding, the court erroneously dismissed an
important formulation of what is testimonial, set forth in Crawford,
defining a testimonial statement as one that "an objective witness would
reasonably believe the statement would be available for use at a later
trial, '35 2 finding that this formulation "casts too wide a net in
categorizing nonaccusatory statements by sexual assault victims to
medical personnel. 353
The court also dismissed the respondent's argument that the
354
Crawford Court's questioning of the continued validity of White,
which involved the admissibility of a child sexual assault victim's
statement to an examining physician made for the purpose of medical
diagnosis or treatment, required a finding that such statements were
3 5 The First District
intended by the Crawford Court to be testimonial.
noted that Crawford questioned White only to the extent that the child
victim's statement to an investigating police officer was found
35 6 The
admissible in the absence of unavailability or cross-examination.
First District also noted that the White Court never reached the issue of
357
Thus, the
medical testimony regarding the perpetrator's identity.
court found that there was no error in the admissibility of Dr. Lorand's
3 58
We agree with
testimony of G.F.'s statements describing the abuse.
with its legal
disagree
but
analysis,
foregoing
the appellate court's
the abuse
describing
conclusion that G.F.'s statements to Dr. Lorand
were not testimonial.
Despite the admissibility of some of Dr. Lorand's statements, the
court found that the errors in the admissibility of the testimony of
Lewis, Detective Dwyer, and Dr. Lorand's were not harmless beyond a
Id. at 804 (citing 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-13 (2000 & Supp. 2004)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
352. Id. See supra Part H.D.1 (discussing whether a particular statement qualifies as
testimonial).
353. Id.
348.
349.
350.
351.

354.
355.

white v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 804-05.

356. Id. at 804.
357. Id. at 805.
358. Id.
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Accordingly, the case was reversed and

B. Crawford's Effect on Illinois' Statutory HearsayProvisions

Crawford will have a drastic effect on the continued validity of
certain Illinois statutory hearsay provisions. Others fall outside the
scope of the rule announced in Crawford and, thus, should not change.
361
1. Business Records
The hearsay exception for business records was singled out by the
Crawford court as an example of a statement that is "by [its] very nature
... not testimonial. ,,162 Perhaps one could argue that under one
formulation of testimonial statements, namely "statements that were
made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a

359. Id.
360. The concurrence, written by Presiding Justice O'Mara Frossard, agreed with the majority
in substance. However, it emphasized that whether a statement is "testimonial ... cannot be
answered ... in a vacuum" but must be answered with respect to the "totality of circumstances."
Id. (Frossard, J., concurring). The concurrence pointed out the fact that the very nature of the
approach in section 5/115-10 to admissibility is fundamentally at odds with Crawford under
many circumstances. Id. at 806 (Frossard, J., concurring). However, the concurrence emphasized
that Crawford should not undermine the admissibility of statements, such as 911 calls and calls to
the DCFS hotline, that are more similar to a "cry for help" than a testimonial statement. Id. at
809 (Frossard, J., concurring).
361. Illinois' hearsay exception for business records is contained at chapter 725, section
5/115-5 of Illinois Compiled Statutes and reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made
as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be
admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if made in regular
course of any business, and if it was the regular course of such business to make such
memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or
within a reasonable time thereafter.
The term "business," as used in this Section, includes business, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind.
(c) No writing or record made in the regular course of any business shall become
admissible as evidence by the application of this Section if:
(1) Such writing or record has been made by anyone in the regular course of any
form of hospital or medical business; or
(2) Such writing or record has been made by anyone during an investigation of an
alleged offense or during any investigation relating to pending or anticipated
litigation of any kind.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-5 (2002 & Supp. 2004).
362. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1367 (2004). See also supra note 101 and
accompanying text (noting that Crawford does not apply to non-testimonial statements).
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later trial, 363 would place business records within Crawford's ambit.
Given the very nature of business records, this argument should fail.
Business records could be considered testimonial if the organization
3 64

for trial.
in question is engaged in the business of preparing materials
For example, if a jurisdiction permits the. admissibility of forensic

reports365 or police reports under a business records hearsay exception,
Crawford would call into question the continued validity of the use of
such evidence.366 Illinois avoids this problem under the business records
exception with respect to police reports by precluding records "made by
anyone during an investigation of an alleged offense or during any
67
of any kind. 3
investigation relating to pending or anticipated litigation
likely leave the business records exception
In sum, Crawford will
3 68
Illinois.
in
unchanged
2. Limited Exception for the Use of Certain
Medical Records in Criminal Trials
As a general rule, medical records are inadmissible in criminal cases
unless the person who made the record testifies at trial and is subject to
cross-examination.169 Furthermore, Illinois precludes the admissibility
370
of medical records as business records by statute and by Supreme
Court of Illinois Rule. 371 The statute provides a limited exception to the
general prohibition of the use of medical records as business records in
372
criminal trials, in the case of blood alcohol and drug tests.
363. Id. at 1364 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers et al.,
Crawford(No. 02-9410)).
364. DANIEL J. CAPRA, 2004 UPDATE FOR EVIDENCE: THE OBJECTION METHOD 28 (2d ed.
2004); FISHMAN, supra note 121, at 207-08. But see Johnson v. Renico, 314 F. Supp. 2d 700,
707 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (noting that statements made to a police officer during booking by the
defendant and another man contained in booking records did not implicate Crawford because
these were admitted under the business records exception and were therefore inherently nontestimonial in nature).
365. Forensic reports, such as coroner's records, are discussed in depth infra Part 111.B.3.
366. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1364.
367. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-5(c)(2) (2002).
368. However, other jurisdictions with a broader business records exception may very well
encounter challenges to certain applications of the business records exception.
369. People v. Giovanetti, 387 N.E.2d 1071, 1081 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979); People v.
App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1973); People v. Aristole, 268 N.E.2d 227,
Gargano, 295 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1971).
230-31 (Ill.
370. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-5(c)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2004).
371. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 236.
372. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501.4 (2002). Section 5/11-501.4 reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of blood tests performed for
the purpose of determining the content of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating
compound or compounds, or any combination thereof, of an individual's blood
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It seems relatively clear that the outcome of a chemical test should
373
not be considered testimonial in light of Schmerber v. California.
Assuming arguendo that the results of these tests are testimonial and
therefore pose a Confrontation Clause issue, 174 Crawford will not create
an admissibility barrier because the Illinois statute specifically excludes
tests performed "at the request of law enforcement authorities. 375
Furthermore, the rationale for the admissibility of evidence under this
section is similar to that of business records, which the Crawford Court
specifically precluded from the testimonial label.376 Therefore, the
Illinois rule as to medical records will likely remain unchanged by the
Crawforddecision.

3. Coroners' Records
Chapter 725, section 5/115-5.1, contains Illinois' statutory hearsay
exception for the admissibility of coroners' records.377 Illinois courts

conducted upon persons receiving medical treatment in a hospital emergency room are
admissible in evidence as a business record exception to the hearsay rule only in
prosecutions for any violation of Section 11-501 of this Code [625 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/11-501] or a similar provision of a local ordinance, or in prosecutions for reckless
homicide brought under the Criminal Code of 1961 [720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1 et
seq.], when each of the following criteria are met:
(1) the chemical tests performed upon an individual's blood were ordered in the
regular course of providing emergency medical treatment and not at the request of
law enforcement authorities;
(2) the chemical tests performed upon an individual's blood were performed by
the laboratory routinely used by the hospital; and
(3) results of chemical tests performed upon an individual's blood are admissible
into evidence regardless of the time that the records were prepared.
625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501.4 (2002).
373. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (holding that the results of blood
alcohol tests are physical characteristics rather than testimonial evidence). While Schmerber
addressed what is testimonial in the Fifth Amendment sense, the results of blood alcohol tests
would also not be treated as testimonial for Sixth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., State v.
Thackaberry, 95 P.3d 1142, 1145 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that a laboratory report indicating
the presence of methamphetamine was likely not testimonial).
374. See, e.g., People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (holding that
the results of tests showing blood alcohol content ordered by law enforcement were testimonial).
375. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501.4(a)(1) (2002).
376. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1367 (2004).
377. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-5.1 (2002 & Supp. 2004). This exception allows for the
coroner's or medical examiner's records "detailing the performance of his or her official duties in
performing medical examinations upon deceased persons or autopsies, or both, and kept in the
ordinary course of business of the coroner's office" to be received as competent evidence in
criminal cases over a hearsay objection. See id. These reports are "admissible as prima facie
evidence of the facts, findings, opinions, diagnoses and conditions stated therein." See id. They
are also admissible "as an exception to the hearsay rule as prima facie proof of the cause of death
of the person to whom it relates." See id.
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7
should find this statute unconstitutional in light of Crawford.11
37 9 The Medical
Coroner's records under this statute are testimonial.
Examiner's Office is a governmental body that "plays a vital role in the
administration of justice."38 For example, the Cook County Medical
3 1 any human death resulting from
Examiner purports to "investigate[]
'38
"criminal
violence'
or
under
"suspicious
or
unusual
38' 3 When a government official makes a statement about
circumstances."
the cause of death of a citizen pursuant to a formal investigation and the
state seeks to admit this into evidence for the truth of the matter
3 84
asserted, this is a testimonial statement.
Although coroners' reports may not resemble ex parte examinations,
they are certainly "statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
385
statement would be available for use at a later trial," and they are
made with substantial governmental involvement. Coroners' records
are made by an arm of the state to ascertain the cause of death of a
certain individual, which often is the precise question that a criminal
case seeks to resolve. This is further supported by Justice Scalia's
assertions in Crawford itself, that coroners' records were not
historically given "any special status" with respect to the requirement of
386th
For these reasons, coroners' records should
cross-examination.
rightly be 87 seen as testimonial, and therefore inadmissible under

Crawford.

3

378. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364 (stating that "testimony ...is typically '[a] solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact"') (quoting
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
379. See FISHMAN, supra note 121 (noting that forensic reports should be considered
testimonial because they are created with the expectation that they would be used as evidence).
at
Examiner,
Medical
the
of
Office
Center,
Info
County
380. Cook
2005).
1,
Apr.
visited
(last
1
http://www.cookcountygov.com/agencyDetail.php?pAgencylD=l
Id.
Id.
Id.
384. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004).
385. Id. at 1367 (internal quotes omitted).
386. Id. at 1361 n.2.
387. Interestingly, the only cases on point in this regard have been decided, summarily, in the
other direction. Two cases decided by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals both decided that
coroner's records are not testimonial. See Perkins v. State, No. CR-02-1779, 2004 Ala. Crim.
App. LEXIS 87, at *18-19 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2004) (finding the autopsy report nontestimonial and distinguishing it from the hearsay in Crawford); Smith v. State, No. CR-02-1218,
2004 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 93, at *24 (Ala. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2004) (determining the
coroner's report admissible under the business-records exception to the hearsay rule). Alabama,
however, governs the admissibility of coroner's records through its usual business records
hearsay exception rather than through an independent statute, as Illinois does. See Baker v. State,
381.
382.
383.
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4. Statements Made By a Child or Mentally Retarded Person in a

Prosecution for Physical or Sexual Abuse
Chapter 725, section 5/115-10, provides Illinois' hearsay exception
for statements made by a child under the age of thirteen or a mentally
retarded person in a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated
on the child or mentally retarded person. 3 " This provision allows not

only the victim to testify about an out-of-court statement that he or she
had made complaining about the act, 389 but it also allows a third person
to testify about statements made to him or her by the child or mentally
retarded person. 390 To allow a third person to testify as to these out-ofcourt statements, the trial court must find "sufficient safeguards of
reliability, 39' the victim must be unavailable as a witness, and there
must be "corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the
392
statement.,
Crawford calls the continued validity of this section into question in
some circumstances.39 3 Clearly, if the victim actually testifies at the
trial, subject to cross-examination concerning the out-of-court
statement, Crawford poses no bar to the admissibility of his or her outof-court statement. 394 However, this statutory provision employs a
Roberts-type reliability inquiry when the victim does not testify.395
Thus, the question becomes whether the out-of-court statement made by
the victim is testimonial or not. Statements made to law enforcement
and government investigators under this statute should be characterized
473 So. 2d 1127 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (holding that autopsy reports were admissible under
Alabama's business records hearsay exception, which was specifically singled out by the
Crawford majority as not testimonial). The Crawford majority specifically singled out coroner's
records as not testimonial. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1363.
388. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (2002).
389. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10(a)(1) (presenting the guidelines for out-of-court
statements).
390. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10(a)(2) (discussing testimony by a third person).
391. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10(b)(l) (outlining the requirement of reliability).
392. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10(b)(2)(B) (providing the conditions necessary for a
third person to testify when a witness is unavailable).
393. But see People v. Miles, 815 N.E.2d 37, 46 (i1. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2004) (Cook, J.,
specially concurring) (arguing that all of section 115-10 is now invalid). Justice Cook disagreed
with the Miles majority that section 115-10 "has any continuing validity." Id. (Cook, J., specially
concurring). Justice Cook opposed trying to "pick out pieces of section 115-10 that might survive
Crawford." Id. (Cook, J., specially concurring). Instead, he suggested that the Illinois legislature
"should decide whether it wants a new section 115-10, one which will be very different
from the
one it enacted." Id. (Cook, J., specially concurring).
394. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 n.9 (2004) ("[W]e reiterate that, when
the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.").
395. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10(b)(1).
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as testimonial under most circumstances under any formulation of the
term.396 Similarly, statements made to physicians, psychologists, or
social workers pursuant to an investigation should be considered

testimonial. 397 However, if the victim's statement is made to a physician
purely for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment, it could be argued that
it is admissible over a Confrontation Clause objection because it may

not be testimonial in nature.3 98 Furthermore, a statement made to a
social worker during a call to a child abuse hotline may also be deemed
"non-testimonial" under certain circumstances.399 Even under these
circumstances, however, the better analysis would look at all the
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement to determine
whether it is indeed testimonial, as there will be situations when even a
call to a child abuse hotline or a statement made to a physician
describing an assault should rightly be considered testimonial.
As far as Illinois is concerned, the First District initially noted that
whether statements to non-law enforcement individuals fall within
Crawford's ambit is "a question left open.,, 400 The issue of whether

396. See People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the
statement of a child victim of sexual assault "given in response to structured police questioning"
was testimonial); People ex rel. R.A.S., No. 03CA1209, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1032, at *10
(Colo. Ct. App. July 17, 2004) (reasoning that the statement of a child made to a police
investigator asking age-appropriate questions in a question and answer format was testimonial
within even the narrowest formulation" of the term); see also In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183,
188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2004) (holding that statements made to a child advocacy worker were
testimonial and inadmissible under Crawford). But see In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 800 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1st Dist. 2004) (noting Justice Thomas's concurrence in part and concurrence in judgment in
White that "not even statements made to police or government officials could be deemed
automatically subject to the right to confrontation").
397. See id. at 801, 803 (holding child victim's statement to a DCFS investigator and a
physician identifying the accused testimonial); Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 47 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2004) (holding that a child victim's statements to a social worker employed by child
protective services was testimonial because the victim was "interviewed for the expressed
purpose of developing their testimony"); see also Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 756 (statements
made to investigators in a facility "specially designed and staffed for interviewing children
suspected of being victims of abuse" were testimonial). But see People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d
687, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that an interview done by a private abuse assessment
organization of a child victim of sexual abuse was not testimonial because it did not resemble an
ex parte examination and was not done by a government employee).
398. See In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 803-04 (holding certain statements made by a sexual assault
victim to a physician describing the assault four and a half months after the assault to a physician
seeing the child in response to a referral from DCFS non-testimonial); see also State v. Vaught,
682 N.W.2d 284, 289-90 (Neb. 2004) (holding that a statement of a child made to an emergency
room physician was not testimonial because it was made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or
treatment).
399. See In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 803 (noting that it is "possible" that a report to a child abuse
hotline would be admissible as non-testimonial hearsay).
400. People v. Thompson, 812 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
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testimonial statements could be made to non-law enforcement officers
was recently revisited in In re TT 401 The First District in T.T.
characterized statements made to a DCFS investigator during an
interview of the seven-year-old victim and statements to a medical
doctor by the victim identifying the perpetrator as testimonial under
4 °2
Crawford.
The First District, however, cautioned that not all
statements to these types of individuals would be deemed testimonial.
Examples given by the court of non-testimonial statements to social
workers include reports to the DCFS hotline or "statements of sexual
abuse overheard by a social worker." 4 3 Despite T.T.'s apparent
willingness to find certain statements made to non-law enforcement
officers testimonial, statements made spontaneously to parents,
teachers, or babysitters by a child who simply seeks to ease the pain of
abuse may fall outside the scope of testimonial statements that
Crawford covers because of the absence of any "government
involvement" 4°4 whatsoever. Informal statements to parents certainly do
not resemble ex parte examinations. The best approach is to examine
the totality of the circumstances to determine if a statement to a non-law
enforcement officer is testimonial.
It is beyond dispute, in light of T.T., that certain applications of this
section that would previously have passed constitutional muster are now
constitutionally flawed. Certainly, the section's test for admissibility,
which relies on an ad hoc judicial determination of reliability of the
statement, conflicts with the very essence of Crawford.0 5 If the
statement at issue is deemed non-testimonial, this judicial determination
of reliability will remain valid. However, testimonial statements must
now be tested through the constitutional lens of Crawford.
Consequently, the continued validity of certain applications of this
section will ultimately depend on which formulation of testimonial
statement Illinois courts choose to apply. 4 6
401.
402.
403.
404.
fashion

In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 792. See also supra Part III.A.4 (discussing In re T.T.).
In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 801-03.
Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
See id. at 800 (noting that "Crawford indicates that governmental involvement in some
in the creation of a formal statement is necessary to render the statement testimonial in

nature").
405. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10(b)(1) (2002) (stating that exceptions to the hearsay
rule are admitted only if "[t]he court finds ... that the time, content, and circumstances of the
statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability").
406. Clearly, T.T. has given Illinois courts some indication of what analysis may be employed
in deciding whether particular statements are testimonial. Nonetheless, there are likely to
continue to be close calls in this inquiry that Illinois courts will have to address including whether
statements of a child to a parent can ever be considered testimonial, whether a child's statement
to a teacher about abuse can be considered testimonial, and whether the child's subjective intent
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At present, the best that can be said about the continued validity of

this hearsay exception in light of Crawford is that it depends on whether
the statement is testimonial or not, and that determination should be

made in light of the particular circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement. However, Crawford will likely operate to exclude many
statements under this section that previously would have been
admissible under the statute.4 °7

5. Prior Inconsistent Statements
Chapter 725, section 5/115-10.1, contains Illinois' statutory hearsay
exception for the prior inconsistent statements of a witness.4 8 This
section satisfies the Confrontation Clause as interpreted by Crawford.
Recognizing that these statements are testimonial in nature, Crawford

does not proscribe admissibility. Section 10.1(c)(1) requires that the
prior statement "be made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other

or expectations in making the statement matters in the testimonial inquiry.
T.T. rejected this subjective inquiry under Justice Thomas's formulation of testimonial
statements, noting that a subjective inquiry such as this would be "difficult to apply and would
entangle courts in a 'multitude of difficulties."' In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 800. Nonetheless, the
Crawford majority specifically recognized that the intent of the declarant may be relevant in
deeming a statement testimonial under another formulation. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.
Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004) (citing formulation of the Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as "statements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial").
407. See Patrick A. Tuite, Ruling Signals Limits on Hearsay, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 26,
2004, at 5 (noting that many statements previously admissible under section 5/115-10(a) would
now be inadmissible under Crawford).
408. Chapter 725, section 5/115-10.1 reads:
In all criminal cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if
(a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing or trial, and
(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
(c) the statement(1) was made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
(2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the witness had
personal knowledge, and
(A) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the witness, or
(B) the witness acknowledged under oath the making of the statement either
in his testimony at the hearing or trial in which the admission into evidence
of the prior statement is being sought, or at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding, or
(C) the statement is proved to have been accurately recorded by a tape
recorder, videotape recording, or any other similar electronic means of
sound recording.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.1 (2002).
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proceeding, ' 40 9 which is clearly testimonial. Statements admitted under
section 10.1(c)(2)(B) would similarly be testimonial, as it requires an
acknowledgement under oath of the making of the statement at trial. 1

Finally, statements under sections 10.1(c)(2)(A) and (C) may be
testimonial if made to a police officer or a government agent or an
individual who is sufficiently identified with the prosecution.41'
Nevertheless, statements under this statute will continue to be
constitutionally admissible notwithstanding Crawford because the
statute demands that the declarant be a witness
at trial and subject to
4 2
cross-examination concerning the statement. 1
6. Prior Statements of a Witness When the Witness
Refuses to Testify Despite a Court Order.

Chapter 725, section 5/115-10.2 provides a hearsay exception for
prior statements of a witness when the witness refuses to testify despite
a court order to do So. 4 '3 This section essentially allows for the
409. 725

ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.1(c)(1).
410. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.1(c)(2)(B) (presenting the requirements for
admissibility of prior inconsistent statements).
411. If a statement that is admitted under section 10.1(c)(2)(A) or (C) was made to a police
officer, it would be testimonial. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.1(c)(2)(A), (C) (outlining
the conditions for the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement). The statute does not
facially limit admissibility to statements made to police officers or government officials,
however. If a statement is made to a private person and is admitted under these sections, it is far
more likely to be considered "non-testimonial."
412. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.1(b). It makes no difference whether or not there was a
former opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant. The statute's requirement for
cross-examination of the out-of-court declarant at trial about the making of the statement satisfies
Crawford. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 n.9 (2004) (noting that "when the
declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at
all on the use of his prior testimonial statements"). This analysis has been adopted by the First
District in Illinois and should be recognized by other courts to be correct. See People v. Martinez,
810 N.E.2d 199, 212 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004) (holding admissible under Crawford a prior
inconsistent statement of a testifying witness). This, of course, is notwithstanding any issues with
respect to whether a testifying witness can be sufficiently cross-examined. See supra Part II.D.2
(analyzing what constitutes sufficient opportunity for cross-examination under Crawford).
413. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.2 (2002 & West Supp. 2003). This section reads, in
pertinent part:
(a) A statement not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay
rule if the declarant is unavailable as defined in subsection (c) and if the court
determines that:
(1) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; and
(2) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(3) the general purposes of this Section and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.
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admissibility of out-of-court statements not covered by any other
hearsay exceptions, but which bear "equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness '41 4 when the declarant refuses to testify
despite a court order to do so. The unavailability of the witness's
testimony precludes present opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
Because the statute employs a Roberts-like reliability standard for
admissibility and because there is no opportunity at trial to crossexamine the declarant about that statement, the statute is
constitutionally deficient under the Confrontation Clause after
Crawford.4 5 If the accused was afforded a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant concerning the statement, there is no
constitutional problem for the admissibility of the statement under the
Sixth Amendment.4 6
The validity of this statute with respect to prior grand jury testimony
4 7
was already addressed in People v. Patterson,
which held that
admissibility of grand jury testimony in the absence of a prior
opportunity for cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause
under Crawford.418
This holding is unquestionably correct and
consistent with Crawford since there can be no dispute that grand jury
testimony is testimonial under any formulation of the term. However,
not all prior out-of-court statements will necessarily be considered
testimonial. If the trial court determines that a statement is "nontestimonial," Crawford will not obstruct the admissibility of the
statement under the provisions of this statute. 41 9 At least three justices
of the Crawford majority concluded that the Roberts test is valid when
it comes to the admissibility of non-testimonial out-of-court
statements 420
.
It is worth noting in this context that Crawford will likely not affect

(c) Unavailability as a witness is limited to the situation in which the declarant persists
in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite
an order of the court to do so.
(d) A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim or lack of
memory, inability or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the
proponent of a statement for purpose of preventing the witness from attending or
testifying.
Id.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.2(a).
Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1365.
Id.
People v. Patterson, 808 N.E.2d 1159 (I11.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2004).
Id. at 1164-65.
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.
See generally FISHMAN, supra note 121 (discussing the concept of testimonial evidence).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

section 10.2(d) at all. Subsection (d), essentially a forfeiture analysis,
states that a witness is not considered unavailable for this section if the
42
proponent of the statement has procured the witness's unavailability. '
Crawford expressly accepted the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing as
consistent with the Confrontation Clause because wrongfully procuring
unavailability "extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially
equitable grounds. 4 22
7. Prior Statements Used in Domestic Violence Prosecutions
Chapter 725, section 5/115-10.2a, provides Illinois' hearsay
exception for the admissibility of out-of-court statements in domestic
violence prosecutions when the declarant is unavailable to testify.423
The underlying statement must be one made by an individual protected
by the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986.424 This hearsay
exception is similar to the hearsay exception for prior statements of a
witness when the witness refuses to testify despite a court order to do
so, 425 as discussed above,426 except that section 10.2a only applies in
certain domestic violence prosecutions, and section 10.2a allows for the
unavailability of the witness/declarant under circumstances other than
refusal to testify despite a court order to do So. 4 27 These additional
grounds for unavailability include privilege, refusal to testify despite a
court order to do so, lack of memory of the subject matter of the prior
statement, health or mental reasons, and inability of the proponent of the
statement to procure the declarant's attendance.428
The Crawford analysis for this exception parallels that of the
exception for prior statements of a witness when the witness refuses to
testify despite a court order to do SO:429 if the out-of-court statement is
421. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.2(d) (2002 & West Supp. 2003).
422. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1370. He or she who wrongfully causes the unavailability of the
testimony of the out-of-court declarant cannot object to the admissibility of the out-of-court
statement under this statute based on Crawford. Id.
423. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.2a.
424. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/201 (2002) (protecting domestic violence victims, children of
domestic violence victims, and individuals who are employed or residing in homes that house a
domestic violence victim).
425. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.2.
426. See supra Part III.B.6 (analyzing the admissibility of prior statements when the witness
refused to testify, despite a court order).
427. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.2a(c) (listing situations in which a declarant may be
considered unavailable).
428. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.2a(c)(1)-(5) (detailing the grounds for
unavailability).
429. See supra Part III.B.6 (analyzing the admissibility of prior statements when a witness
refuses to testify, despite a court order).
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testimonial, Crawford will preclude the admissibility of the statement
unless the accused has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant about the out-of-court statement. 43 ° Both sections employ the
same constitutionally-flawed reliability inquiry. Statements made to

police officers and other law enforcement personnel should be
construed as testimonial. Similarly, statements made to governmental
agencies, for example DCFS,43 1 will often fit into the testimonial
category. Statements that are deemed non-testimonial will presumably
still be admissible under this section. 41' Also, the forfeiture provision
contained in this section will remain valid.433
8. Prior Statements of Elder Adults in a Prosecution for Abuse,
Neglect, or Financial Exploitation.434
Chapter 725, section 5/115-10.3, excepts from the general preclusion
of hearsay evidence those out-of-court statements made by an elderly
430. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365 (2004).
431. See In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 801 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004) (holding in a child
sexual assault case that a child's statements to a DCFS investigator were testimonial).
432. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 (acknowledging that non-testimonial statements are
admissible).
433. See supra notes 421-22 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of effect Crawford
will likely have on forfeiture provisions in subsection 10.2).
434. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.3 (2002 & West Supp. 2003). This section reads, in
pertinent part:
Hearsay exception regarding elder adults. (a) In a prosecution for a physical act, abuse,
neglect, or financial exploitation perpetrated upon or against an eligible adult, as
defined in the Elder Abuse and Neglect Act [320 ILCS 20/1 et seq.], who has been
diagnosed by a physician to suffer from (i) any form of dementia, developmental
disability, or other form of mental incapacity or (ii) any physical infirmity, including
but not limited to prosecutions for violations of Sections [citations omitted] the
following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:
(1) testimony by an eligible adult, of an out-of-court statement made by the
eligible adult, that he or she complained of such act to another; and
(2) testimony of an out-of-court statement made by the eligible adult, describing
any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act which is an
element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution for a physical act,
abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation perpetrated upon or against the eligible
adult.
(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:
(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of
reliability; and
(2) The eligible adult either:
(A) testifies at the proceeding; or
(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act
which is the subject of the statement.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 36

"eligible adult" who suffers from mental or physical infirmity in a
prosecution for "physical act[s], abuse, neglect, or financial
exploitation ' 435 perpetrated against the "eligible adult." This section is
similar to Chapter 725, section 5/115-10, governing the admissibility of
hearsay statements of a child in a prosecution for physical or sexual
abuse of the child.436 Both sections contain the same infirmities with
respect to Crawford.37 If the "eligible adult" actually testifies at the
trial subject to cross-examination about the out-of-court statement,
Crawford will pose no bar to the admissibility of the statement and
section 10.3 may be applied notwithstanding Crawford.438 However, if
a third person testifies about an out-of-court statement made by the
"eligible adult" as section 10.3(a)(2) would allow,439 Crawford would
preclude admissibility of this testimony if the out-of-court statement is
deemed testimonial and the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial. 440
Section 10.3 allows for a third person to testify about the declarant's
out-of-court statement if there are "sufficient safeguards of
reliability," 44' the declarant is unavailable, and there is "corroborative
evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement." 442 This
represents essentially the same constitutionally-defective, Roberts-type
reliability inquiry that Crawford rejected." 3 Consequently, testimonial
statements admitted under this section that do not provide the accused
an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about his or her statement
will violate Crawford.4"
The ultimate effect of Crawford on this section will depend on the
formulation of what is a testimonial statement. Clearly, statements
made in response to direct, structured police questioning will be
inadmissible under Crawford, unless there has been a prior or present
opportunity for cross-examination by the accused. Similarly, statements
made to governmental investigators (for example, those investigating

435. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.3(a) (2002).
436. See 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/115-10 (2002) (outlining certain hearsay exceptions in
Illinois); see also Part I.B.4. (discussing the section that governs the admissibility of hearsay
statements of a child in a prosecution for physical or sexual abuse).
437. See supra Part III.B.4 (discussing the effects of Crawford on the section governing the
admissibility of statements made by a child or mentally retarded person in a prosecution for
physical or sexual abuse).
438. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 n.9 (2004).
439. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.3(a)(2).
440. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365.
441. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.3(b)(1).
442. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.3(b)(2)(B).
443. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.
444. Id. at 1365.
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nursing homes) should be inadmissible if testified to only by the
investigator. Whether statements made to non-governmental persons
(for example, statements made by the "eligible adult" to family
members about nursing home abuses) will survive Crawford would
depend upon the formulation of testimonial statements that Illinois
courts adopt.
9. Prior Statements of a Deceased Declarant
Chapter 725, section 5/115-10.4, provides a hearsay exception for the
admissibility of out-of-court statements when the declarant has since
died. 445 This section provides for the admissibility of prior statements
made by a declarant "under oath at a trial, hearing, or other
proceeding '446 where the declarant is presently unavailable because of
his or her death. 447 As in section 10.244' and section 10.2a," 9 section
10.4 requires that the offered statement not be specifically covered by
any other hearsay exception 450 and that it bears "equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 45 1 Once again, this statute
is constitutionally
flawed because it applies a Roberts-like analysis for
42
admissibility.
Some applications of this statute may remain unaffected because the
accused will have had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant at the prior trial, hearing, or proceeding concerning the out-of453 If the accused did not have a
court statement, satisfying Crawford.
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant (for example, before a
grand jury), the application of this statute would violate the
Confrontation Clause under Crawford because statements made "under
oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding ' 454 are testimonial under any
conception of the term, and the death of the declarant would preclude
any present opportunity for cross-examination. Even before Crawford,

445.
446.
447.
448.
refuses
449.

725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.4.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.4(d).
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.4(c).
See supra Part II.B.6 (analyzing the admissibility of prior statements of a witness who
to testify despite a court order).
See supra Part III.B.7 (discussing the prior statements of a witness in domestic violence

prosecutions).
450.
of prior
451.
hearsay
452.
453.
454.

See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/115-10.4 (providing the requirements for the admissibility
statements when the declarant is deceased).
See id. (codifying the "trustworthiness" standard of Roberts to admit evidence over a
objection).
See, e.g., id. (enunciating a Roberts-like test).
Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004).
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.4(d) (2002).
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courts rarely admitted grand jury testimony that was never crossexamined under this exception.455
Statements would presumably still be admissible under this section if
the accused wrongfully procured the unavailability of the declarant by
causing the death of the declarant, because confrontation rights would
be forfeited under these circumstances. 5 6
10. Substantive Admissibility of Prior Statements of Identification
Chapter 725, section 5/115-12, contains the hearsay exception for
statements of identification by the declarant.457 This section requires
that the identification be made after the declarant perceives the
person,458 that the declarant testify at the present trial or proceeding,459
and that the declarant be subject to cross-examination about the out-ofcourt identification.4 6 ° Unlike the common law rule, this section permits
statements of identification to be used for purposes other than to merely
corroborate in-court identification. Under the statute, a statement of an
out-of-court identification can be used substantively as a substitute for
the declarant's inability to make an in-court identification or to bolster a
weak in-court identification by the declarant.4 6 1
Consequently, Crawford will leave this exception unaffected for a
number of reasons. First, the opportunity at trial to cross-examine the
declarant about the out-of-court identification will cure any
Confrontation Clause problems with respect to the identification,
notwithstanding any lingering issues with respect to whether there has
been a sufficient prior opportunity for cross-examination that satisfies
the Clause. 4 62 However, where the declarant denies making the out-ofcourt identification or cannot recall making it, there will be a serious
constitutional problem under Owens46 3 as well as Crawford.
Situations may arise where prior identifications will not be deemed
455. See People v. Smith, 776 N.E.2d 781, 793-94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2002) (holding that
admissibility of a deceased witness' grand jury testimony did not have sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness to satisfy the Confrontation Clause).
456. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370 (discussing the admission of evidence over a hearsay
bar when confrontation rights are terminated).
457. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-12.
458. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-12(c).
459. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-12(a).
460. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-12(b).
461. People v. Bowen, 699 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).
462. See supra note 166-67 and accompanying text (discussing Owens and the admissibility
of statements where a witness has a gap in memory and is available for cross-examination).
463. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559-60 (1988). See supra Part Il.D.2 (discussing
Owens and cross-examination).
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testimonial at all. While the identification of the accused in a line-up is
testimonial because of the structured environment of the line-up and the
governmental involvement in it, an identification made to a friend may
not be testimonial. 464 Consequently, section 5/115-12 will likely operate
unimpeded in light of Crawford.
11. Statements to Medical Personnel by a Victim for the Purposes of
Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.
Chapter 725, section 5/115-13, establishes the hearsay exception for
statements made by a victim to medical personnel for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment in a prosecution for certain sexual
offenses. 65 This includes "descriptions of the cause of symptom, pain
or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or
external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment. ' 466 Therefore, the trial court must determine whether the
statements made by the victim are reasonably pertinent to the victim's
diagnosis or treatment.
Crawford potentially threatens the continued validity of certain
applications of this statute. The primary question is whether and under
what circumstances such statements qualify as testimonial. The First
District in T.T.46 7 recently held that statements made by a child victim of
sexual abuse describing the nature of the abuse to a physician were nonThe court noted that the
testimonial under section 5/115-13.468
perpetrator, and simply
the
identify
or
accuse
not
did
statements
explained the manner in which the abuse occurred. 4 69 The court
discounted the facts that the exam occurred as a direct result of a
referral by DCFS to investigate the alleged abuse, that the physician
was a member of the child abuse protection unit, that the doctor asked
the child specific questions about sexual abuse, and that the exam took
47 °
place nearly four and a half months after the alleged abuse.
Consequently, the court held that the statements, "made by a patient
[and] for the 472purpose of medical
with a selfish interest in treatment
,,471•
In so doing, the
diagnosis and treatment, 47 ' were non-testimonial.
464. For example, under a highly formalistic formulation of testimonial, statements of
identification made to private individuals would not be considered testimonial.
465. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-13 (2002).
466. Id.

467. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
468. Id. at 804.
469. Id.

470. Id. at 803.
471. Id. at 804.
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court announced unequivocally that, under section 5/115-13, "a victim's
statements to medical personnel regarding 'descriptions of the cause of
symptom, pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the
cause or external source thereof' are not testimonial in nature where
such statements do not accuse or identify the perpetrator of the
assault. 473
While many statements made to physicians for the purpose of
medical diagnosis and treatment should be deemed non-testimonial,
Crawford does not impose a per se rule with respect to these statements.
A trial judge, as well as a reviewing court, should examine all the
circumstances under which the statement was made to determine if it
was testimonial. While there are innumerable relevant factors in this
analysis, the physician's connection with a formal investigation, the
extent to which the exam seeks to gather evidence for a future
prosecution, the use of specific questions about the abuse, and the time
between the abuse and the examination should all be considered in the
inquiry. There are clearly some statements made to medical personnel
under this section that should rightly be deemed testimonial, such as an
out-of-court statement of the victim identifying her abuser.474
In the past, Illinois courts have allowed the admissibility of
statements made to medical personnel under this section despite the fact
that the purpose in seeing the physician was to develop testimony for
trial.475 One court noted that the diagnostic function of a medical
examination was not necessarily incompatible with an investigatory
function, and that Illinois' statute does not distinguish between
examining and treating physicians.4 76 Crawford casts serious doubt on
the continued validity of these cases. Statements made in anticipation
or solely for the purpose of litigation would clearly be "made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
' 77
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. A
Although there may not be governmental involvement in every instance
of a statement made to medical personnel and the circumstances may
472. Id.
473. Id. (quoting 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-3 (2002)).
474. Id. at 803 (concluding that a statement identifying the perpetrator was testimonial).
475. See, e.g., People v. Falaster, 670 N.E.2d 624, 629 (Il1. 1996) (holding that the hearsay
exception provided by section 5/115-13 included a statement from a victim to a nurse who sought
medical attention solely as a means of developing evidence for prosecution).
476. Id.
477. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004). But see In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d
at 804 (noting that focusing on whether the statement was made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for
use at a later trial "misses the mark" and "casts too wide a net").
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not always resemble an ex parte examination, a person seeking to
for trial clearly bears testimony within the meaning of
develop evidence
47 8
Crawford.

The second issue evaluates whether statements to medical personnel
identifying the accused as the perpetrator are testimonial. In the past,
Illinois courts have allowed identification statements as "reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" under certain circumstances, such as
when the perpetrator is a member of the victim's family, reasoning that
well-being. 479
the identification is necessary for the victim's future
However, as evinced by T.T., 48 many statements identifying the
perpetrator of an assault are clearly testimonial.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, post-Crawford, held that a statement
by a child to an emergency room physician was not testimonial despite
the child's identification of her uncle as the perpetrator because these
statements were reasonably related to diagnosis and treatment of the
child. 48' The court noted that the victim's family took the child victim
48 2 The
to the hospital for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment.
court also noted that there was no indication that the purpose of the
examination was to develop testimony for trial 483 and there was no
indication of any government involvement in the initiation or course of
treatment.484 The Nebraska Supreme Court, however, did not foreclose
the possibility of finding certain statements made to medical personnel
to be testimonial. 485 This fact-specific inquiry allows courts to have
flexibility to separate statements made for medical diagnosis or
treatment from statements that bear testimony. Illinois should follow, in
most instances, the example of the Nebraska Supreme Court, but should
reject the admissibility of the identification of the abuser.
C. Illinois Common Law Hearsay Exceptions
As with the statutory hearsay exceptions, Crawford will affect some
of the common law exceptions, depending largely upon a determination
of whether the statement is testimonial.

478. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364.
479. See Falaster,670 N.E.2d at 629-30 (holding that identification of the accused sexual
abuser was reasonably pertinent to proper diagnosis because the accused was the victim's father).
480. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 804.
481. State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Neb. 2004).
482. Id. at 291.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. See id. at 292 (noting that the decision "does not preclude a different conclusion based on
a different set of facts").
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1. Admissions-Defendant's Own Express Admission
A court may substantively admit a defendant's own out-of-court
statement as an exception to the hearsay rule.486 Crawford should not
affect the use of a defendant's own statement against him or her,
whether it is testimonial or not, because the defendant does not have a
constitutional right to confront himself or herself.487 Thus, even clearly
testimonial statements, such as the accused's prior grand jury testimony,
may be used against the accused notwithstanding Crawford.
2. Admissions by Silence or Implied Admissions
Generally, the silence of the defendant, an evasive answer, or an
unresponsive reply may be introduced as a tacit or implied admission of
guilt if the defendant remains silent in the face of an accusation of
criminal conduct.4 88 Before such statements are admissible, it must be
shown that the defendant heard the statement, that he or she reacted by
silence, and that he or she would have been expected to deny the
statement. 489 However, silence of the accused is not an admission in a
custodial interrogation setting.
Defendants, through silence, may
exercise their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.4 90
Crawford will not affect the admissibility of admissions by silence.
The constitutional analysis should be the same as for express
admissions, since silence is viewed as an affirmative response; there is
no constitutional right to confront oneself. 49 Alternatively, even if a
486. People v. Hobbs, 79 N.E.2d 202, 206 (Ill. 1948). The statement need not be predicated
on the declarant's personal knowledge; it need not be against interest when made; it may contain
opinions; and it may be offered whether or not the out-of-court declarant testifies. See JOHN E.
CORKERY, ILLINOIS CIVIL & CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 560, 586 (2000) (describing the defendant
admission exception to the hearsay rule).
487. Professor Daniel Capra notes (in the context of the Federal Rules of Evidence) that a
defendant could theoretically argue that a confession made to police is testimonial within the
meaning of Crawford and that admitting the confession would violate his right to confrontation
unless the declarant (himself) is subject to cross-examination. CAPRA, supra note 364, at 27.
Professor Capra says that the response to this argument is that the defendant could take the stand
and confront himself, thus removing any Crawford violation. If the defendant refuses to do so, he
arguably has procured his own unavailability, which would operate as a waiver of confrontation
rights. Id. While the success of this argument may be problematic on constitutional grounds (i.e.
the defendant is being forced to choose between his Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights
and his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights). It appears unlikely that the courts will find a
constitutional right to confront one's own statement.
488. Hobbs, 79 N.E.2d at 206.
489. RALPH RUEBNER, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL TRIAL EVIDENCE 232-33 (3d ed. 1997).
490. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself .... ").
491. This view seems to be in accord with authorities commenting on Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(B). See, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 121, at 16-17 (noting that statements
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constitutional right to confront oneself existed, Crawford should have

no or minimal impact on the admissibility of such admissions because
in many instances they are not testimonial. For example, silence by the
accused in the face of police questioning or accusation would not
qualify as an admission because the silence may be consistent with the
defendant's exercise of his or her constitutional right to remain silent or
with the defendant's compliance with the advice of counsel to remain
silent.492 At the other extreme, silence in the face of an accusation by a
private citizen or an acquaintance would not fit any of the formulations
of a testimonial statement as set forth by the Crawford Court: there is
little resemblance to an ex parte examination; there is no governmental
involvement; and objectively, the accused would not believe that silence
could be used prosecutorially.493
3. Adoptive Admissions
A person may adopt the statement of another and make it his or her

own statement.494 Crawford should not affect the admissibility of
adoptive admissions for the same constitutional reason that permits
the accused has no constitutional right to confront
ordinary admissions:
495
himself or herself.

4. Admissions of an Agent
Illinois generally applies the traditional test, set forth in Big Mack
Trucking Company, Inc. v. Dickerson,496 to assess whether an agent's
admitted under this exception would clearly not be testimonial unless made to a police officer or
other public official).
492. People v. Murphy, 509 N.E.2d 1323, 1327 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1987); People v.
Warner, 459 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1984); People v. Deberry, 361 N.E.2d 632,
634 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1977); People v. Owens, 337 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist.
1975).
493. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004).
494. People v. Simpson, 369 N.E.2d 1248, 1252 (Ill. 1977); Pagel v. Yates, 471 N.E.2d 946,
950 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1984).
495. See supra Part IIIC.1 (discussing admissions against oneself). But see Shields v.
California, 124 S. Ct. 1653 (2004) (vacating a judgment of the California Court of Appeals that
allowed the admissibility of an adoptive admission in the absence of an opportunity for crossexamination). Shields may be inconsistent with the continued validity of the admissibility of
admissions of the accused because adoptive admissions are treated no differently than the party's
own admission. People v. Castille, 108 Cal. App. 4th 469, 484 (2004). On the other hand,
Shields dealt with an adoptive admission of a co-defendant's statement made during the course of
a joint police interrogation. In either event, the United States Supreme Court found this
significant enough to vacate the judgment, thus casting at least some doubt on the continued
validity of these types of admissions. Shields, 124 S. Ct. at 1653.
But see
496. Big Mack Trucking Co. v. Dickerson, 497 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1973).
Pietruszynski v. McClier Corp., Architects and Eng'g, 788 N.E.2d 82, 88-89 (I11. App. Ct. 1st
Dist. 2003) (allowing admission of an employee's statement pertaining to his employment against
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statement may be used as an admission against his or her principal.4 97
Although this most often applies in the employer/employee context,
traditional agency principles govern whether the statement of an agent
is an admission of a principal. 49 ' For example, an attorney or a spouse
may act as an agent and, consequently, make an admission against his
or her principal.4 9 9 Essentially, the Illinois courts apply a strict test to
ascertain whether the principal had authorized the agent to make the
statement. 500 Not surprisingly, courts generally find a lack of principal
authorization for damaging statements made by agents.50' This view
runs contrary to the present trend which permits the admission of a
statement by an agent against the principal when the agent makes the
statement concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment and during the existence of that relationship.0 2 Before
undertaking any Crawford inquiry, the court must evaluate whether the
underlying statement meets Illinois' strict view of agency admissions.
Assuming that the agent has express authority to make the statement,
the next inquiry is the now-familiar evaluation of whether the admission
made by the agent is testimonial.5 3 If the underlying statement is
testimonial, Crawford's effect on the admissibility of the statement is
unclear. For instance, Professor Daniel Capra offers the example of
statements of corporate agents made to government officials who were
investigating allegations of corporate criminal misconduct.5 4 He posits
that these statements could be seen as testimonial because of the
governmental involvement and the investigatory purpose in eliciting the
statement. 5°5 Nonetheless, should a court find the agent's statement
testimonial, the principal would find it difficult to object to the
admissibility of the out-of-court statement since there is no
constitutional right to confront oneself and since the admission of an
agent is considered an admission of the principal.
the defendant employer).
497. Taylor v. Checker Cab Co., 339 N.E.2d 769, 775 (I11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1975);
CORKERY, supra note 486, at 467.
498. People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d 636, 665 (I11.1994).
499. Id.
500. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, CLEARY & GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE §
802.9 (8th ed. 2004).
501. See id. (discussing the relatively strict nature of the test applied by Illinois courts to
determine principal authorization of agent's statements).
502. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) (defining an agent's statement made within the
scope of the agency of employment as admissible over a hearsay objection).
503. If it is not, obviously Crawford is inapplicable. See supra Part II.D.1 (exploring the
background and definition of "testimonial statement").
504. CAPRA, supra note 364, at 27.
505. Id.
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A persuasive counterargument is that considering an agency
admission as the party's own statement is really just a legal fiction. The
accused-principal did not actually express the words attributed to and
used against him or her. Consequently, the question is whether this
legal fiction should trump the defendant's constitutional right to

confront the actual maker of the out-of-court statement.

Rules of

evidence should not be used mechanically to defeat the constitutional
right of the accused. 0 6 However, perhaps the Illinois requirement that
the agent-declarant have express authorization to speak for the
principal-accused acts as a safeguard of the defendant's rights and may
mitigate in favor of finding that the accused has no right to confront
statements of his or her agent.0 7
5. Co-Conspirator's Statements as Admissions
Statements of a co-conspirator are admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule against all other conspirators if made during the course of
and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 8 However, statements to law
enforcement personnel after arrest are not in furtherance of a
conspiracy.50 9 Under this exception, any witness who has personal
knowledge of the statement, including an informant, a police officer, or
another member of the conspiracy, may introduce the co-conspirator's
statement at trial.510
Crawford should have no effect on a co-conspirator's admissions
because a statement cannot be both testimonial and in furtherance of a
By its very nature, a co-conspirator's out-of-court
conspiracy. 511
506. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1972) (noting that "where
constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule
may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice").
507. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 802.05 (2d ed. 2004).
Weinstein notes that "if the declarant has been expressly empowered by the party to make
statements on his or her behalf, these statements should be treated as statements of the party and
should still be admissible after Crawford." See id. (explaining the vicarious agency exception to
the hearsay rule).
508. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987); People v. Steidl, 568 N.E.2d 837,
849 (Ill. 1991); People v. Taylor, 632 N.E.2d 234, 238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994); People v.
Sanchez, 546 N.E.2d 268, 272 (11. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1989).
509. People v. Hairston, 263 N.E.2d 840, 855 (Ill. 1970); People v. Eddington, 473 N.E.2d
103, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1984).
510. GRAHAM, supra note 500, at § 802.10.
511. Professor Capra notes that statements of co-conspirators made to undercover law
enforcement officers could arguably be both testimonial and "in furtherance of a conspiracy"
because of the involvement of a government official. CAPRA, supra note 364, at 28. However,
unless Illinois decides to adopt an extremely broad formulation of testimonial, it is unlikely that
co-conspirator's admissions will ever be affected by Crawford. See, e.g., United States v. Saget,
377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that statements between a co-conspirator and a
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statement is not testimonial. It has one purpose: to advance the
conspiracy, not to defeat it. The Crawford opinion recognizes this,
noting that statements in furtherance of a conspiracy are "by their nature
'
... not testimonial."512
If the statement is not testimonial, Crawford is
inapplicable and co-conspirator admissions will be admitted against the
513
accused under the state's existing rules of evidence. Cases in Illinois,
as well as cases from other jurisdictions5 4 and other authorities, are in
accord with this view.515
6. Dying Declarations
To qualify as a dying declaration, the declarant must be unavailable
because of death and the statement must: (1) relate to the cause and
circumstances of the homicide;5 16 (2) be made under a fixed belief and
moral conviction that death is impending and certain to follow almost
immediately, although the declarant need not have lost all hope of
recovery; 5 7 and (3) the declarant must be in possession of sufficient
mental faculties to understand what he or she is doing and to be able to
give a true and correct account of the facts to which that statement
relates.5 1 s In Illinois, dying declarations are admissible only in criminal
homicide trials. 51 9 The statement must relate to the cause of the
declarant's own homicide and the declarant must actually die.520
As with other common law hearsay exceptions, the central inquiry for

confidential government informant were not testimonial and were admissible under Crawford in
the absence of an opportunity for cross-examination).
512. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004).
513. See People v. Cook, 815 N.E.2d 879, 893 (11. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004) (holding the
statement of a co-conspirator was admissible under Crawford).
514. See United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that statements
made to a co-conspirator were not testimonial); United States v. Reyes, 362 F.3d 536, 541 n.4
(8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the admission of statements of a co-conspirator in furtherance of
conspiracy did not offend the Confrontation Clause); Diaz v. Herbert, 317 F. Supp. 2d 462, 481
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (concluding that the admission of statements by a co-conspirator in furtherance
of conspiracy did not offend the Confrontation Clause).
515. See generally FISHMAN, supra note 121 (noting that statements in furtherance of a
conspiracy under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) are "clearly not 'testimonial"'); see also
CAPRA, supra note 364 (noting that "[i]t seems unlikely that a co-coconspirator would make a
qualifying statement that would result in 'testimony' under Crawford').
516. People v. Odum, 188 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Il. 1963).
517. People v. Tilley, 94 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ill. 1950).
518. People v. Georgakapoulos, 708 N.E.2d 1196, 1203 (Il. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1999); People
v. Walker, 635 N.E.2d 684, 690 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994); People v. Cobb, 542 N.E.2d 1171,
1178 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989).
519. Georgakapoulos, 708 N.E.2d at 1203 (defining a dying declaration as "a statement of
fact made by the victim relating to the cause and circumstances of the homicide").
520. CORKERY, supra note 486, at 582.
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the admissibility of a dying declaration under a constitutional analysis is
whether the statement is testimonial. This, in turn, depends on the
court's formulation of what is a testimonial statement. For example, a
statement made to a police officer in response to questioning by the
officer should be considered testimonial.52' On the other hand, a
statement made to a friend or family member may not qualify as
testimonial. 52 2 If the dying declaration is "non-testimonial," Crawford
does not apply and the dying declaration exception will operate
unimpeded.52 3
In either event, the Crawford opinion suggests that dying declarations
may be a sui generis oddity. 524 Crawford envisions the admissibility of
testimonial dying declarations:
The one deviation we have found [with respect to the historical trend
of only admitting testimonial statements against an accused if the
declarant is unavailable and the accused has been afforded an
opportunity for cross-examination] involves dying declarations. The
existence of that exception as a general rule of criminal hearsay law
cannot be disputed. Although many dying declarations may not be
testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those that clearly are.
We need not decide in this case whether the Sixth Amendment
incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations. If51this
5
exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.
The Crawforddictum, consequently, leaves the question open.526
7. Declarations Against Interest
Statements against interest are admissible as an exception to the
521. See State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 793-94 (Kan. 2004) (determining that police
questioning a victim of a night club shooting about the identity of the shooter constituted an
interrogation and thus the victim's responses would most likely be considered testimonial under
Crawford). But see People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 2244, at *4 (Mich.
Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004) (holding a statement of a mortally wounded shooting victim in response
to police asking "what happened?" was not testimonial).
522. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004) (noting that "[a]n accuser
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person
who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not").
523. Id. at 1365.
524. Sui generis is defined as meaning "[off its own kind or class; unique or peculiar."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
525. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367 n.6 (citations omitted).
526. Professor Richard D. Friedman notes, in this regard, that admitting statements under the
dying declaration exception using the rationale of the United States Supreme Court "obscures the
clarity and clutters the simplicity" of the Crawford rule. Friedman, supra note 176, at 12.
Instead, Professor Friedman suggests an understanding of the admissibility of these statements as
"a reflection of the basic principle that if the defendant renders a witness unavailable by wrongful
means, the accused cannot complain validly about the witness's absence at trial." Id.
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hearsay rule. The exception contemplates statements against the
declarant's penal, pecuniary, or proprietary interest at the time of its
making.127 The statement must be an out-of-court declaration of a
person, other than a party to the litigation, who has knowledge of the
facts declared and no motive to falsify,5 28 and the declarant must be
unavailable.529
a. Exculpatory Statements Against Interest
A statement against interest is generally not admissible to exculpate
the accused.5 30 The reason for exclusion is that it would encourage the
introduction of perjured testimony showing that an unavailable third
person had inculpated himself or herself and exculpated the accused.
However, there is a constitutional exception to this rule of prohibition.
53 1 the United
In Chambers v. Mississippi,
States Supreme Court
recognized the superior right of the accused to defend himself using an
exculpatory statement under a four-part test that takes into account the
following factors: (1) whether the statement was made spontaneously to
a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred; (2) whether the
statement was corroborated by other evidence; (3) whether the
statement was self-incriminating and against the declarant's interest;
and (4) whether the declarant was available for adequate crossexamination by the state.
Crawford should not affect the admissibility of statements against
interest offered by the accused to exculpate himself or herself.
Regardless of whether the statement is testimonial or not under
Crawford, the fact that the accused offers the statement against the state
means that the Confrontation Clause has no implication at all. The state
has no Confrontation Clause rights.532 Consequently, assuming that the
statement meets the Chambers conditions of admissibility, the
exculpatory statement against interest will likely have continued
validity, notwithstanding Crawford.

527. People v. Lettrich, 108 N.E.2d 488, 491 (Ill. 1952); Buckley v. Cronkhite, 393 N.E.2d
60, 64 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1979); Merritt v. Chenowski, 373 N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (I11App. Ct.,
3d Dist. 1978).
528. People v. Ward, 609 N.E.2d 252, 269 (I11.1992).
529. Levy v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 175 N.E.2d 607, 611 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1961).
530. Lettrich, 108 N.E.2d at 491-92; People v. Williams, 475 N.E.2d 1082, 1088 (I11.App. Ct.
1st Dist. 1985); People v. Bowel, 473 N.E.2d 962, 965 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 488 N.E.2d 995 (I11.1986).
531. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-01(1973).
532. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .. ") (emphasis added).
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b. Inculpatory Statements Against Interest
The primary use of a statement against interest is to inculpate the
accused. Even before Crawford, there were limitations on the use of
such statements. Generally, an unavailable accomplice's out-of-court
confession inculpating the accused was considered inherently unreliable
because of the strong motive on the part of the declarant to fabricate or
shift blame from himself or herself to the accused.533 A statement
against interest made to the police or law enforcement personnel by an
unavailable declarant that names or directly or indirectly implicates the
accused is presumptively unreliable.534
Crawford has made it absolutely clear that, absent past or present
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, such testimonial statements
are barred by the Confrontation Clause.535 Even before Crawford,
confessions or admissions of a co-defendant were inadmissible against
the accused at either a joint or separate trial because they were
presumptively unreliable 53 6 or not "firmly rooted" under Roberts.537 The
Supreme Court in Williamson v. United States suggested that such
statements could still be used indirectly or circumstantially. 53 8 Lee v.
Illinois suggested that when there are insignificant discrepancies

533. CORKERY, supra note 486, at 591 (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999)).
534. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131-32 (1999).
535. The United States Supreme Court has taken action consistent with this. See Goff v.
Ohio, 124 S. Ct. 2819 (2004) (vacating the judgment of Court of Appeals of Ohio in State v. Goff,
796 N.E.2d 50 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003), which had admitted a statement against interest made to the
police against the accused by an accomplice without affording the accused an opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant). Authorities from other jurisdictions are in accord, as well. See,
e.g., United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 2004) (ruling that statements against
interest made to declarant's girlfriend and friend implicating the defendant were not testimonial);
United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896, 902 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (holding that a statement
against interest made to a government prosecutor was testimonial and inadmissible under
Crawford); Morten v. United States, 856 A.2d 595, 602 (D.C. 2004) (holding that the confession
of the nontestifying co-defendant was inadmissible against the accused); People v. Deshazo, 679
N.W.2d 69 (Mich. 2004) (holding that a statement against penal interest made to a friend and not
to law enforcement was not testimonial); State v. Allen, 2004 Ohio 3111, *P31 (Ohio 2004)
(holding that a statement against interest made to police was testimonial and inadmissible in the
absence of cross-examination); People v. Cervantes, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 744, 783 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that a statement to an acquaintance incriminating self and co-defendant was not
testimonial); People v. Jones, No. 246617, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 1457, at *2-3 (Mich. Ct.
App. June 10, 2004) (finding a statement against interest to police testimonial and inadmissible in
the absence of an opportunity for cross-examination).
536. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 608 (1994); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541
(1986)
537. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 118-19 (concluding that statements in a fifty-page confession did
not satisfy the firmly rooted hearsay exception detailed in Roberts).
538. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 604 n.* (suggesting that an accomplice's statements may be
admissible under other provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence rules 801-04).
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between the confession of the accused and a co-defendant's confession,
the co-defendant's statement
may be admissible as a reliable
5 39
"interlocking" confession.

In light of Crawford, any statement or confession by a co-defendant
or of an accomplice made to law enforcement personnel, whether it
directly or indirectly inculpates the accused, and whether it interlocks
with the accused's confession or not, should not be allowed against the
accused unless the declarant is produced as a witness at trial and the
accused has an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about the
out-of-court statement."'
Crawfcrd now clearly forecloses any
constitutional exception advanced pursuant to
Williamson, Lee, or Lilly
to allow the admissibility of such statements. 5 4 1

8. Former Testimony
A transcript, audiotape, or videotape containing the testimony of a

witness from a former trial, judicial proceeding, or an evidence
deposition may be admitted as substantive evidence against an accused
at a subsequent trial as an exception to the hearsay rule.5 42 This
exception requires that: (1) the prosecution demonstrate that the
declarant is unavailable to testify; (2) the factual issues in the current
case are substantially the same as those in the prior proceeding; and (3)
a showing be made that the accused had a sufficiently similar motive
and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the former trial or

539. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 545 (noting that "when the discrepancies between ["interlocking"
confessions of co-defendants] ... are not insignificant, the co-defendant's confession may not be
admitted"). The Crawford majority asserts that this is "merely a possible inference, not an
inevitable one." Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1368 (2004).
540. Id. at 1369 n.9.
541. The United States Supreme Court seems to have validated this in Prasertphong v.
Arizona, 124 S. Ct. 2165 (2004). In Prasertphong,the Arizona Supreme Court admitted as a
statement against interest a statement of a co-defendant that incriminated the accused under
language in Lilly that seemed to allow the admissibility of accomplice statements against the
accused "when the circumstances surrounding the statements provide considerale assurance of
their reliability." State v. Prasertphong, 75 P.3d 675, 686 (Ariz. 2003) (citing Lilly, 527 U.S. at
130). The Arizona Supreme Court also cited Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Williamson
that noted that "a declarant's statement is not magically transformed from a statement against
penal interest into one that is inadmissible merely because the declarant names another person or
implicates a possible co-defendant." Id. at 687 (citing Williamson, 512 U.S. at 606 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)). The United States Supreme Court predictably vacated this judgment and remanded
the case. Prasertphong,124 S. Ct. at 2165. As the statement was made to police and the accused
was afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, Crawfordrequires that this statement
be excluded. Id.
542. People v. Zehr, 469 N.E.2d 1062 (I11.1984); People v. Doss, 514 N.E.2d 502, 507 (I11.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1987).
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proceeding.143 To satisfy admissibility, the motive and focus of the
cross-examination at the earlier proceeding must have been similar to
what it would be at the current trial. 44

Unquestionably,

former

testimony

is

testimonial

under

any

formulation of the term. 545 However, Crawford specifically permits the
admissibility of former testimony under the Confrontation Clause
because this hearsay exception itself requires that the declarant be
unavailable and that the accused had a sufficient opportunity to crossexamine the declarant.546 The only limitation to the admissibility of
such statements will require a fact specific determination focusing on
whether the accused was given a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant and whether the accused had a similar motive to develop the
testimony of the declarant.54 7 Crawford should be interpreted, in this
inquiry, to focus on the opportunity to develop the testimony, rather
than its quality. 4 8
9. Spontaneous Statements or Excited Utterances

The proponent of a spontaneous statement must prove three
foundational elements:

(1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to

produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) absence of time
to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of
the occurrence. 549 The declarant may be a participant in or a mere
witness to the occurrence. 5 0 The guarantee of trustworthiness for this

543. See People v. Rice, 651 N.E.2d 1083 (Ill. 1995) (holding former testimony given at a
suppression hearing inadmissible because of the limited nature of the evidence introduced at the
hearing); see also CORKERY, supra note 486, at 575 (explaining the former testimony hearsay
exception found in Federal Rule of Evidence rule 804).
544. CORKERY, supra note 486, at 576.
545. See supra Part lI.D.l.a (identifying clearly testimonial statements as including former
testimony).
546. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1369 n.9 (2004). See WEINSTEIN, supra note
507, at § 802.05(f) (noting that "[sitatements admitted under the exception for former testimony
under Rule 804(b)(1) will not violate the Confrontation Clause, because the hearsay exception
itself requires that (1)the declarant be unavailable and (2) the defendant had the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant").
547. See supra Part II.D.2 (defining what sufficient opportunity for cross-examination under
Crawford entails).
548. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (noting that "the Confrontation
Clause guarantees only 'an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination
that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."' (citing
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985))).
549. People v. Shum, 512 N.E.2d 1183, 1191-92 (Il1. 1987); People v. Lloyd, 660 N.E.2d 43,
50 (I11.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1995).
550. People v. Poland, 174 N.E.2d 804, 807 (Il. 1961).
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exception is that it is made spontaneously without time to fabricate.551
However, some statements may still qualify as excited utterances even
if they have been made in response to brief questions.552 There are a
number of ways that spontaneous statements or excited utterances can
be evaluated in light of Crawford.
The continued validity of the admissibility of spontaneous statements
or excited utterances should depend on a fact-specific inquiry. If the
statement is testimonial, Crawford precludes the use of the statement
unless there was or is now an opportunity for cross-examination of the
declarant by the accused.553 Again, the extent to which Crawford will
modify existing law with respect to these statements depends on how
broadly Illinois courts are willing to characterize a statement as
testimonial. Some applications of this exception will remain unaffected
by Crawford because many spontaneous statements are made to a
parent, friend, or acquaintance or under circumstances not likely to be
considered testimonial.55 4 On the other hand, statements made to police
officers or other governmental investigators should generally be
construed as testimonial.55 5
The Indiana Court of Appeals has expressed doubt that excited
utterances could ever be deemed testimonial. It noted that "[a]n
unrehearsed statement made without reflection or deliberation, as
required to be an excited utterance, is not 'testimonial' in that such a
statement, by definition, has not been made in contemplation of its use
in a future trial, 5 5 6 and that it is "difficult to perceive how such a
statement could ever be 'testimonial.'

57

Under this rationale, courts

551. Id.
552. CORKERY, supra note 486, at 525.
553. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004).
554. Id.
555. See, e.g., People v. Peay, No. 242443, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 1628, at *9-10 n.2
(Mich. Ct. App. June 17, 2004) (ruling that an excited utterance was not testimonial because it
was not made to a government official); State v. Orndorff, 95 P.3d 406, 786-87 (Wash. Ct. App.
2004) (holding a statement made by a victim at one time to another victim as failing to meet the
characteristics of a testimonial statement). The Crawford Court seems to be in accord, as it noted
that White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), a case that upheld the admissibility of the statement of
a child victim to an investigating police officer as a spontaneous statement, was "arguably in
tension" with the new rule of Crawford. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1368 n.8. In this regard, White
is of doubtful validity after Crawford. See generally FISHMAN, supra note 121 (noting, in the
context of the Federal Rules of Evidence, that excited utterances will not likely be testimonial
unless made to a police officer or other public official).
556. See Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a police
officer's semi-structured questioning of a domestic violence victim was not testimonial).
557. Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a domestic
violence victim's statements to police on the scene were not testimonial). See Brooks v. State,
NO. 2001-KA-01826-COA, 2004 Miss. App. LEXIS 616, at *38 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2004)
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have found Crawford inapplicable to excited utterances in the form of
911 calls,558 to statements made in person to police officers on the scene
of a recent crime, 5'9 and, in one case, even to a statement made to a

police officer in response to questions at the police station by a
declarant who went there to report an assault and death threat. 560 This,
however, is an extreme formulation that Illinois should reject.
One particularly troublesome area in this regard is 911 calls. There is
currently disagreement among courts as to where 911 calls fit into
Crawford's framework. Some courts interpreting Crawford have found
911 calls to be testimonial because they often contain formal questions
posed to the caller by a government official and because the caller is
generally calling to report a crime and to supply information to the
561
police.
On the other hand, some courts view 911 calls as "nontestimonial, ,,162 reasoning that 911 calls are not initiated by the police563
and are usually placed to get help rather than to provide prosecutorial
information. 564
In that sense, 911 calls are more akin to "an
electronically augmented equivalent of a cry for help" than an ex parte
examination for trial.565 Under this view, 911 calls are seen as "part of
the criminal incident itself, rather than as part of the prosecution. 56 6
Courts employing this view have seemed to find the very idea of a 911
call to be consistent with the requirements of an excited utterance.5 67
It remains unresolved which approach Illinois will employ in
addressing a Confrontation Clause challenge to the admissibility of 911

(noting that "[u]nder Crawford, excited utterances

...

surely are non-testimonial").

558. People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (Crim. Ct. 2004)
559. State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 27-28 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
560. State v. Barnes, 854 A.2d 208 (Me. 2004) (holding that a statement was not testimonial
because the declarant was under stress of the alleged assault and was simply seeking safety and
aid).
561. See People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (finding 911 calls made by two
witnesses to report their observations of a recent shooting to be testimonial).
562. See, e.g., People v. Isaac, No. 23398102, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 814, at *6-7 (Dist Ct.
June 16, 2004) (finding a 911 call was not testimonial as it was not part of the criminal incident);
People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274 (2004) (concluding two 911 calls were made to stop an
assault in progress and therefore were not testimonial); Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879 (holding that
a 911 call was not testimonial as it was placed by a citizen who desired rescue from peril).
563. Isaac, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 814, at *7; Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
564. Isaac, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 814, at *7; Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 276-77; Moscat,
777 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
565. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
566. Isaac, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 814, at *6-7 (citing Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 880).
567. See Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 880 (noting that "the 911 call qualifies as an excited
utterance precisely because there has been no opportunity for the caller to reflect and falsify her
(or his) account of the events").
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calls. In In re T.T.,56 s the First District implicitly addressed this issue in
the context of calls to a child abuse hotline. The court noted, citing the
New York case of People v. Moscat, 69 that it was "possible that a
scenario could arise in which a report to a DCFS hotline ... would be
admissible as non-testimonial hearsay. 57 ° While this is far from a
definitive statement on the issue, the First District seems to indicate that
a call of this nature requires an ad hoc evaluation of whether the caller's
statement is testimonial. Since 911 calls (and calls to child abuse
hotlines) can serve law enforcement and prosecutorial purposes or be
deemed merely as cries for help, the better approach for Illinois to take
is to have the trial judge make a fact specific determination in each case.
In so doing, the trial court should focus on the unique circumstances
surrounding the making of the call to inquire whether the call was a
mere cry for help or an evidence gathering testimonial statement.
10. Then-Existing State of Mind.
A declarant's out-of-court statements about his or her then-existing
state of mind, such as intent, plan, motive, design, or feeling are
admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted, as an exception to
the hearsay rule. 571
Crawford's effect on this exception will depend upon which
formulation of testimonial statement the Illinois courts employ.
However, most then-existing state of mind statements should not be
characterized as testimonial simply because they are normally casual
remarks made to acquaintances, a circumstance inconsistent with a
57 2 For example,
testimonial statement, according to Crawford.
the
Michigan Court of Appeals held that a murder victim's statements to
her mother and some friends that the defendant stalked her and that she
feared for her life did not qualify as testimonial, and therefore were
properly admitted under the hearsay exception for then-existing state of
511
mind.573 Commentators
agree. 574
568. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
569. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
570. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 802-03.
571. People v. Bartall, 456 N.E.2d 59, 71 (111. 1983); People v. Sanchez, 546 N.E.2d 268, 272
(I11.
App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1989); People v. Grabbe, 499 N.E.2d 499, 506 (Ill.
App. Ct. 4th Dist.

1986).
572. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004) (noting that "[a]n accuser

who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person
who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not").
573. People v. Williams, No. 246011, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 1217, at *6-7 (Mich. Ct. App.
May 13, 2004).
574. See, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 121, at 4 (noting, in the context of the Federal Rules of
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However, then-existing state of mind statements made to a police
officer should be considered testimonial.57 5 For example, a statement
made by an eventual murder victim to the police complaining that the
defendant stalked her and that she feared for her life should be deemed
testimonial because the declarant has provided vital information of a
law enforcement nature, beyond a cry for help. Also, the act of
reporting to the police and the recording of that statement by the police
department makes this a testimonial statement under some formulations
of the term. This exception should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
to determine whether Crawford precludes admissibility of the out-ofcourt statement.
11. Past Recollection Recorded
A written document containing an out-of-court declaration is
admissible as a past recollection recorded statement if the proponent
establishes the following foundation: (1) the declarant appears at trial
and testifies; (2) the witness has no present recollection of the incident
described; (3) the document does not refresh the recollection of the
witness; (4) the written document was prepared by the witness at the
time of or soon after the incident that prompted him or her to record it;
witness vouches for the truth and accuracy of the
and (5) 5the
76
document.
These statements are allowed as an exception to the hearsay rule
because they contain sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and
reliability because they were prepared at or near the time of the event
577 The document is
while the witness's memory was clear and accurate.
preparing it.578
not admissible if the witness does not remember
However, past-recollection-recorded statements may be records or
memoranda that would be inadmissible under other exceptions as
58°
hearsay, such as police reports 579 and medical and hospital records.
Evidence, that the hearsay exception for then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition is
"clearly not 'testimonial"' unless made to a police officer or other public official); WEINSTEIN,
supra note 507, at § 802.05 (noting that statements of existing state of mind are not likely to be
testimonial in nature under Crawford).
575. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364.
576. People v. Unes, 493 N.E.2d 681, 685 (11. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1986).
577. Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 970 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1984); People
v. Olson, 375 N.E.2d 533, 536 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1978).
578. People v. Carter, 391 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1979); People v. Jenkins,
294 N.E.2d 24, 29 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1973).
579. People v. Stausberger, 503 N.E.2d 832, 834-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1987) (stating that
police reports are not admissible as substantive evidence or as business reports but may be used

for impeachment purposes or to refresh the recollection of a witness).
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Crawford will substantially affect this hearsay exception if the
statement is deemed testimonial. Whether past recollection recorded
statements are testimonial should depend on the motivation of the
declarant in making the statement.
Was it created to merely
memorialize an event or did the declarant have an evidentiary intent in
creating it? This requires a fact specific inquiry in each case. For
example, does a witness to a hit-and-run accident who takes down the
offender's license plate number make a testimonial statement? Under
one formulation, the declarant is writing this down with a reasonable
expectation that it could and would be used for prosecutorial purposes.
On the other hand, there is no government involvement in the initial
making of the statement, the declarant has initiated the statement
himself or herself, and there seems little resemblance to an ex parte
examination. However, police reports admitted as past recollection
recorded are testimonial because such reports are prepared for law
" '
enforcement purposes.58
The presence of the declarant at trial as a witness will likely not cure
Confrontation Clause problems.
One essential condition for the
admissibility under this exception is that the witness has no present
recollection of the event recorded. This foundational requirement
negates a constitutional condition for the admissibility of an out-ofcourt statement and will deny the accused a sufficient opportunity to
cross-examine the witness concerning the out-of-court statement in
violation of the Confrontation Clause and Crawford.582 The success of
this argument will likely depend on how broadly Illinois courts choose
to interpret the "opportunity for cross-examination" for Crawford
583
purposes.
IV. CONCLUSION

Crawford will continue to challenge Illinois courts to reevaluate its
common law and statutory hearsay rules.
Similarly, the Illinois
legislature must vigorously reassess the various legislative hearsay rules
it has enacted over the last decade. Perhaps in this process of
reevaluation of Illinois evidence law, Crawford can serve as a clarion
580. Wilson v. Parker, 269 N.E.2d 523, 524-25 (Il1. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1971) (citing cases that
disallowed the admissibility of medical records when there was no contention that the record was
a past recollection recorded).
581. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004).
582. But see State v. Gorman, 854 A.2d 1164, 1171-74 (Me. 2004) (admitting grand jury
testimony substantively as past recollection recorded despite the declarant's inability to recall
ever having given the grand jury testimony).
583. See supra Part II.D.2 (elucidating what constitutes an opportunity for cross-examination).
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call to the judiciary and the legislature to conduct a comprehensive
review of Illinois evidence law. A joint enterprise of the two branches
of government would best serve the interests of justice in this state, and
progress in this endeavor is long overdue.
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